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ABSTRACT
As the industry for exporting sea urchins to Japan has
peaked on the West Coast of America due to over-harvesting,
the sea urchin population in Maine's coastal waters have been
harvested in increasing volumes since 1987 to meet the demand
of the Japanese market. In order for Maine harvesters to
avoid the decline experienced on the West Coast, steps must be
taken by participants within the industry to voluntarily
control harvesting activities in order to ensure the continued
reproductive success of the sea urchin population, and thus
the export industry itself.
This thesis begins by documenting the evolution of the
sea urchin industry in the state of Maine as an example of the
utilization of a common property resource in the marine
environment. Garrett Hardin's "Tragedy of the Commons" is
considered in light of computer experiments performed in game
theory which test the success of cooperative behavior between
competitive individuals in an autonomous environment. A
change in perspective toward the limited stock of natural
resources in the environment is advocated in light of
alternative valuation techniques for unique natural resources.
The lobster industry in Maine will be examined in order to
determine what cultural and regulatory conditions have allowed
that harvesting activity to be sustained over so many years.
The most important factor affecting the sustainability of
ecologically sound harvesting activities is the maintenance of
stable and limited populations of harvesters where
accountability for infractions of locally accepted norms is
enforced by the members of the population of harvesters.
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Title: Professor of Marine Systems
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Chapter I
Introduction
Purpose of the Thesis
This thesis is an investigation of the sea urchin
industry in the state of Maine in light of concepts and
insights gained from a consideration of diverse ideas offered
by various thinkers on cooperation within economic systems and
the valuation of their components in the natural environment.
The central idea around which these concepts will be discussed
is stated below.
The sustainable development of the green sea urchin,
Strongylocentrotus droebachiensis, a common property
resource in the state of Maine is contingent upon:
1) the maintenance of stable and limited
populations of harvesters
2) the utilization of ecologically sound
harvesting techniques
3) the direct empowerment of the agents within the
industry in managing the resource in conjunction
with oversight agencies in the state government.
While this thesis is concerned mainly with sea urchins as
a finite, renewable economic resource within the state of
Maine, the biological characteristics and ecological
environment must be considered as these concepts directly
affect the continued vitality of the population through
successful reproduction. A generally qualitative study of
game theory, particularly the Prisoner's Dilemma scenario,
will be undertaken in order to gain guidelines in inducing
cooperative behavior within a population of marginally
competitive agents. Consideration of some useful tools in
properly discerning the value of a resource in its natural
state will be necessary in order to defend conservation
measures which must be implemented in the course of managing
the resource in order to assure the availability of the
resource to future members of the industry.
Outline of the Chapters
Chapter I will present the central idea of this thesis
and the scope and limitations of the components within the
paper. Brief summaries of the ensuing chapters are presented
for the reader as well.
Chapter II will examine the growth of the sea urchin
industry in the United States and as an export product in
Maine. The number of harvesters participating in the market,
the volume of urchins caught annually, and the value of the
urchins exported from Maine to Japan will be documented. The
steps taken by the state management authority to regulate the
harvesting and processing of the sea urchins will also be
documented.
Chapter III will describe the biology and ecology of the
sea urchin as it relates to the value of the export market in
Maine. The techniques associated with the harvesting and
processing of sea urchins will then be described. The
influence of external factors on the harvesting and processing
activities within the state (overseas demand characteristics,
agents in the sale and transport of urchin products) on the
amount and type of harvesting will also be examined.
Chapter IV will be a more general presentation of a
social dilemma commonly referred to as "The Tragedy of the
Commons." Through a brief description of Hardin's essay and
consideration of his conclusions, an understanding may be
gained of the constraints under which the activities
associated with harvesting sea urchins occur. The concept of
using game theory in economic problems, such as "Prisoner's
Dilemma," is then explored as a tool for examining some of the
conditions in which cooperation between competitive agents may
evolve with minimal assistance from state regulators. This
"organic" concept of cooperation, characterized by a community
of self-policing agents, is encouraged as a means of ensuring
that all participants in the harvest and processing of sea
urchins abide by the agreed upon limits to the activity of
removing sea urchins from their natural environment.
Chapter V will propose a necessary change of attitude
toward the limited stock of natural resources on our planet.
Concepts useful in the discussion of sustaining the stocks of
a resource such as option value, existence value, and the
discount rate will be presented through a consideration of
valuation tools which are necessary for the sustainable
utilization of a natural resource. The use of these valuation
tools along with the concepts gained from the consideration of
game theory is encouraged as a means of achieving the
sustainable development of the sea urchin industry.
Chapter VI will examine the techniques implemented in the
management of the lobster industry, as this is an example of a
finite, renewable, common property resource that has been
successfully maintained over a substantial period of time.
The regulatory framework, as well as the market organization
of relationships between harvesters, dealers, transporters and
buyers, will be documented in order to glean any understanding
of what concepts might be useful to the successful management
of the sea urchin industry.
Chapter VII will integrate the information and ideas of
the previous chapters into a set of conclusions and
recommendations for the future management of the sea urchin
industry in Maine. A summary of the thesis will also be
presented.
Chapter II
Evolution of the Sea Urchin Industry
in the State of Maine
Realizing the Value of Sea Urchins in America
Sea urchins, long considered only a sea-pest to many of
the coastal fishermen on both Atlantic and Pacific coasts,
underwent a drastic re-evaluation in California during the
late 1970's. With the escalating popularity of sushi bars in
the hip culture of California, it was discovered that the
spiny bottom-dwelling creatures, specifically, the fleshy,
yellow/orange colored sex organs of the organisms, were
considered a delicacy in Asian countries, predominantly in
Japan. While a small number of fishermen in Maine sought to
scoop them out of the waters since the 1930's for ethnic
communities in the Northeast, the yearly catch was minuscule
compared to groundfish levels, hovering at a constant level of
about 100,000 pounds per year. For the most part, it was done
in order to carry them through the off-seasons of the major
groundfish and lobster industries.'
For the Japanese, an island people, seafood has always
been a staple of their diets. With the advent of
1 Scattergood, L.W. The Sea Urchin Fishery. (Fishery Leaflet 511:
U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Bureau of Commercial Fisheries, Washington,
D.C., 1961), 2.
transportation technologies which are able to send fresh
seafood products around the world, it became feasible to the
Japanese to import more of their food products. Japan has
historically been the major harvester of sea urchins, but this
has changed significantly in the last decades, with its share
of the global catch falling from 73 percent in 1975 to 17
percent in 1992. The United States has become the largest
supplier of whole sea urchins and processed roe, reaching a
value of $155 million in 1994. This has been attributed to:
healthy demand by Japanese consumers; declining harvest levels
in Japanese waters; different peak seasons in Japan's and the
U.S.; and a strong yen relative to the U.S. dollar. Tariffs
are applied to U.S. exports of sea urchin products, under an
agreement reached through the World Trade Organization, of
between 9 and 12 percent depending on how the urchins are
packaged, with no tariffs applied for live urchins.2
One of the most thriving locations for the transactions
of these fresh products is in Tokyo, at the Tokyo Wholesale
Fish Market which supplies seafood to more than 25 million
people in the Tokyo area. Depending on the quality, the
urchin roe at the market can sell for between $15 and $100 a
pound. It is prepared in a variety of ways for consumption,
but most often the ovaries are prepared as a component of
sushi, the traditional dish of vinegared rice and raw fish.
In department stores, the roe can be found in bottles, canned
or as a paste. Because Maine's green sea urchin is comparable
by sight and taste to the native purple/black urchin found in
Japanese waters, it is often sought out over urchins
2 Sonu, S.C. The Japanese Sea Urchin Market. (NOAA Technical
Memorandum: National Marine Fisheries Service, Long Beach, CA,
September, 1995), 12.
originating from others locations around the world.3
The predominance of the urchins along the West Coast,
combined with their stationary existence, made them easy
picking to anybody who had access to a boat and scuba gear.
From 1982 to 1992, the value of urchins brought onto the docks
of California's seafood market rose dramatically from $3.5
million to $29 million.4  Not surprisingly, with the rising
value of the urchins as a component of the California's
seafood market, reaching nearly one quarter of the $131
million market, more people became involved in the harvesting
and the stocks began to be depleted. Regulations on the
number of days at sea divers are allowed, size limits, and a
reduction of the total number of licenses issued to divers
(from a peak of 915 to a goal of 400) were enacted by the
Department of Fish and Game. These regulations have been
successful in reducing the total number of urchins harvested,
dropping from 52 million pounds to 30 million pounds by 1988.5
As well as the current demand for sea urchins as a
delicacy for consumption, there is a significant potential for
sea urchins to be in demand for the chemical compounds that
are stored within their organs. As pharmaceutical companies
continue their search for sources of new drug bases to combat
various ailments, sea-borne organisms are increasingly being
researched for possible compounds that might be gleamed from
the millions of years of the sea urchin's evolutionary
development. For example, compounds called mycosporin-like
3 Kleiman, D. "Scorned at Home, Maine Sea Urchin is a Star in Japan,"
New York Times, 3 October 1990, p. 1C.
4 Munk, N. "Choppy Waters." Forbes, 25 October 1993, p. 108.
5 Ibid.
amino acids, have been found in sea urchins that consume a
marine algae which produces the compound. The more algae
consumed, the more the compound is bio-accumulated. Tests
have shown that this compound plays a factor in protecting sea
urchin eggs from the harmful effects of ultraviolet rays.
Currently, research is being carried out, by Malcolm Schick of
the Department of Zoology at the University of Maine, in an
attempt to isolate the compound in order to determine if it
would be useful as a pharmalogical product. While this
approach is many years away from fruition, the possible impact
on the demand of sea urchins should not be discounted in
future analyses.6
Geographic Shift in Harvesting Pressures
With the implementation of protection measures by the
authorities in California, harvesting activities shifted to
new locales, notably Massachusetts, Washington, Oregon,
British Columbia, and Maine in 1987. At the time, dollar/yen
exchange-rates were quite favorable, making the long transport
route economically viable. The peak harvest season in Japan
is from approximately April until September, but the peak
consumption period is during the holiday season in December
and January. This translates into an advantageous position
for Maine harvesters, as the prime picking season extending
from November until March, during the period of greatest
demand and weakest supply in Japan. This caused a dramatic
6 Goad, M. "Ocean Yields Treasures for Biomedical Uses," Maine Sunday
Telegram, 19 November 1995, p. 16B.
rise in the volume of urchins landed in Maine, as shown in
Figure 1 below.
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Because of the distinguishing market preference
prevailing in Japan, quality, as appraised by color and size
consistency, determines the value of the roe; if it is
appealing to the eyes and palate of the Japanese dealer, it
can easily command more than $100 per pound., This translated
into rising wharf prices for Maine harvesters.
7 Sonu, p. 25.
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Figure 2
As shown in Figure 2 above, the price per pound paid at
the wharf in Maine more than quadrupled, from less than 20
cents to more than 80 cents, in eight years.
Dock Value of Sea Urchins Landed, 1987 - 1994
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Figure 3
The rising dock values, combined with the increasing
volume of urchins being exported, resulted in a substantial
escalation of the total value of the resource to the industry
within the state, as shown in Figure 3 above. This was third
in fisheries revenues for 1993, after lobsters and pen-raised
finfish.
Legislative Response to the Boom
The response to the increase in urchin harvests on the
West Coast has been varied across the three states of
California, Oregon and Washington. In California, the fishery
expanded to 25 million pounds landed in 1981, predominantly in
southern California. By 1985, pressures had increased in
northern California and statewide landings grew to a peak of
52 million pounds in 1988. In 1987 the Department of Fish and
Game and the Sea Urchin Advisory Committee agreed upon a plan
which: reduced the number of harvesting permits from 915 to
400; set a minimum size for urchins landed; enacted seasonal
restrictions; required log books to be maintained and turned
in by divers; and closed certain areas to harvesting
permanently for ecological studies.8
In Oregon, the fishery first developed in earnest after
landings started falling in southern California in 1986 and
the harvest peaked at 9.3 million pounds in 1990. In 1988 the
first management restrictions were enacted which limited the
number of harvesters by a non-transferable permit system with
non-issued permits allocated by lottery and minimum landings
of 20,000 pounds in the previous year required for renewal, a
minimum harvest depth, a diameter limit of 3½ inches.'
By 1976 the landings in Washington had increased to
S Haaker, P. "The Southern California Red Sea Urchin: A Case History."
In Sea Urchins, Abalone, and Kelp: Their Biology, Enhancement and
Management. Eds. C.M. Dewees and L.T. Davies. (La Jolla, CA:
California Sea Grant College, 1992), p. 30.
McCrae, J. "Oregon Sea Urchin Fishery, 1986-1991." In Sea Urchins,
Abalone, and Kelp: Their Biology. Enhancement and Management. Eds. C.M.
Dewees and L.T. Davies. (La Jolla, CA: California Sea Grant College,
1992), p. 32.
approximately 1.5 million pounds which prompted more stringent
regulatory measures after surveys were conducted on suggested
management measures. Prior to this, only licenses and records
of landings were required of harvesters. Fishing districts
were formed which were rotated for harvesting every three
years; this allowed replenishment to occur in depleted areas.
Upper and lower size limits were also established to ensure
successful reproduction, and closed seasons were enacted to
coincide with maximum roe yield. When landings reached 8.1
million pounds in 1989, the first emergency closure was
ordered to preserve the industry. In the following season,
sea urchin divers and state officials jointly authored a
limited-entry system with a goal of establishing 45 vessels to
harvest the coastal waters. This measure, however, was
rejected by the court as too restrictive, so the goal was
increased to approximately 100 vessels and limits on the
fishing week and number of persons on a boat were enacted.10
With the dramatic rise by 1987 of the volume of urchins
being harvested in Maine, due in part to the "wild west"
mentality of the 1,439 licensed harvesters in the otherwise
unregulated environment, attention was finally turned to the
resource with six fatalities of urchin divers during the 1992-
93 season. Most of the accidents in the operations have been
the result of attempts to maximize productivity during time at
sea, putting the examination of safety issues in a secondary
position. During the 1994 legislative session, emergency
measures were enacted requiring safety training for all urchin
10 Bradbury, A. "A History of Red Sea Urchin Management in Washington:
The Manager's Perspective," In Sea Urchins, Abalone, and Kelp: Their
Biologvy Enhancement and Management. Eds. C.M. Dewees and L.T. Davies.
(La Jolla, CA: California Sea Grant College, 1992), p. 33.
and scallop divers. This was the opening shot fired from the
regulators of marine resources in the state, leading to the
implementation of more specific restrictions on the type and
timing of activities allowed in the harvesting of sea urchins
in the coastal waters of Maine.
The law stipulated that all divers and tenders must take
a safety course offered by the Department of Marine Resources
prior to receiving their 1995 permit licenses. This law had a
special importance to participants in the harvest, as those
persons not holding licenses for the 1995 season would not be
able to reapply until 1999. A provision was included in the
law grandfathering all current licensed harvesters who had
been active for three years prior to the enactment of the law
would not have to take the course, but only a safety seminar.
Waivers were granted to those persons who were already
adequately trained for diving, through such programs providing
SCUBA certification, diver/rescue training, CPR/first aid, or
equivalent. Proof of open water scuba certification is a
prerequisite for taking the course. While many of the
independent-thinking harvesters grated at the idea of
authorities telling them how to do their job, the post-course
opinions have been predominantly positive, with the manner in
which material is presented being more suggestive than
imposing.'n
In order to control the number of individuals
participating in various aspects of the industry, licensing
requirements were established by the Legislature for the
following activities in the industry: diving; dragging;
11 "Safety Course Mandatory for Diver Licensing," Commercial Fisheries
News, February, 1995, p. 4B.
tendering to a diver; operating a platform; transporting sea
urchins or parts; possessing and dealing sea urchins; and
processing sea urchins.
A sea urchin hand fishing license requirement was adopted
in 1993, § 6748 was Hand fishing sea urchin license:
1. License required. It is unlawful for a
person to engage in the activities authorized
by the license under this section without a
current hand fishing sea urchin license or
other license issued under this Part
authorizing the activities.
2. Licensed activity. The holder of a
hand fishing sea urchin license may take sea
urchins by hand or possess, ship transport or
sell sea urchins taken by that licensee.
3. Eligibility. A hand fishing license
may be issued only to an individual and is a
resident license.
4. Fees. The fee for a hand fishing sea
urchin license is $89.
A sea urchin draggers license requirement was adopted in
1993, § 6748-A Sea urchin draggers license:
1. License required. It is unlawful for a
person to use a boat for dragging for sea
urchins unless that boat carries a sea
urchins dragging license issued by the
commissioner.
2. Licensed activity. A boat licensed
under this section may be used for dragging
for sea urchins. The license also allows the
captain and crew members aboard the licensed
boat to drag for and possess, ship, transport
and sell sea urchins.
3. Eligibility. A sea urchin dragging
license may be issued only to an individual
and is a resident license.
4. Fee. The fee for a sea urchin dragging
license is $89.
A license allowing persons to perform the duties of
tending a boat during sea urchin harvesting activities was
created in § 6748-B Sea urchin boat tender license:
1. License required. It is unlawful for a
person to operate a boat as a platform for
harvesting of sea urchins by hand unless that
person is licensed under this section or
section 6748.
2. Licensed activity. A person licensed
under this section may operate a boat as a
platform for the harvesting of sea urchins by
hand. A sea urchin boat tender license does
not authorize the holder to harvest sea
urchins.
3. Eligibility. A sea urchin boat tender
license may be issued only to an individual
and is a resident license.
4. Fee. The fee for a sea urchin boat
tender license is $89.
The specification on what constituted a drag, and on how
an acceptable drag could be used was provided in 1993, § 6748-
C Drags:
Except as provided in this section, it is
unlawful for any person to fish for or take
sea urchins using a drag, or any combination
of drags, in any coastal waters of the State.
1. Exception. The commissioner may adopt
rules that allow the use of a drag that is
designed to minimize impact on the benthic
environment and harvested resources. Rules
adopted by the commissioner under this
section must describe the type of drag that
may be used, including any limitations on
type or size of drag components or
limitations on the length or width of the
drag.
This article is repealed January 1, 1999,
pursuant to 12 M.R.S.A. § 6749-T.
Absolute seasonal limits on the harvesting of sea urchins
from the all of the State's coastal waters were imposed in §
6749 Sea urchin harvesting season:
It is unlawful for a person to fish for or
take sea urchins from May 15th to August
15th, both days inclusive.
The state's coastal waters were divided into two zones
which segregate the timing of harvest activities in a
legislative act passed in 1993. This limitation is imposed
for a finite period of time, from 1995 to 1998. The law, §
6749-N Closed areas: 1995 to 1998, reads as follows:
Notwithstanding section 6749, in calendar
years 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998, it is
unlawful for a person to fish for or take sea
urchins from:
1. Zone 1. Zone 1, from April 1st to
August 15th. For the purposes of this
article, "Zone 1" means all coastal waters
west of a line beginning at the easternmost
point of Fort Point State Park on Cape
Jellison then running southwesterly to
channel marker #1 south of Sears Island, then
running southwesterly to channel marker W2
located between Marshall's Point and Bayside
in the Town of Northport, then running
southwesterly to channel marker #9 east of
Great Spruce Head located in the Town of
Northport, then running southerly to Graves
channel marker northeast of the Town of
Camden, then running southeasterly to the
Penobscot Bay Buoy east of Rockland harbor,
then running southerly to the TB1 whistle
southwest of Junken ledge, then running
southeasterly to Red Nun #10 buoy at Foster
Ledges, then running due south to the
boundary of the State's coastal waters; and
2. Zone 2. Zone 2, from May 15th to
October 1st. For the purposes of this
article, "Zone 2" means all coastal waters
east of that line established in subsection
1, including all coastal waters of the
Penobscot River north of Fort Point State
Park.
The commissioner shall report annually to
the joint standing committee of the
Legislature having jurisdiction over marine
resource matters on the quantity and type of
sea urchin licenses sold in each zone in each
year.
A moratorium on the extension of licenses to new members
was adopted by the legislature in 1993, § 6749-0 Limited
entry:
The commissioner may not issue a hand
fishing sea urchin license or a sea urchin
dragging license for calendar years 1994,
1995, 1996, 1997 or 1998 to any person unless
that person possessed that license in the
previous calendar year.
This section is repealed January 1, 1998
pursuant to 12 M.R.S.A. § 6749-T.
The restrictions and limitations associated with the
licenses issued by the commissioner for the harvesting of sea
urchins were stipulated in § 6749-P Licenses by zone:
For calendar years 1995, 1996, 1997 and
1998, a person eligible to purchase a license
under section § 6749-0, may purchase those
licenses only for Zone 1 or Zone 2. All of
those licenses issued to any one person in
any one year must be for the same zone. A
sea urchin dragging license must list the
documentation or registration number of the
vessel to be used by that licensee when
dragging. A vessel documentation number may
not be listed of more than one sea urchin
boat license.
This article is repealed January 1, 1999,
pursuant to 12 M.R.S.A. § 6749-T.
Limitations on the minimum size of sea urchin that may be
removed from coastal waters are stipulated in § 6749-A Minimum
size:
It is unlawful for a person to take,
possess, ship, transport, buy or sell a sea
urchin having a shell measuring less than 2
inches in the longest diameter, exclusive of
spines. A violation of this section does not
occur if a harvested sea urchin measuring
less than 2 inches in the longest diameter is
culled on board immediately after harvesting
and is liberated live into the marine waters.
Restrictions were passed by the Legislature prohibiting
the simultaneous possession of sea urchins and lobsters on a
boat in § 6749-B Sea urchins and lobsters; simultaneous
possession or transport prohibited:
A person licensed under section 6748 to
take sea urchins by hand may not
simultaneously possess or transport sea
urchins and lobsters aboard a registered
vessel.
The authority of the commissioner to adopt rules
regarding the handling and processing of sea urchins,
including the right to impose management restrictions, was
made explicit in § 6749-C Rules:
1. Importation and processing. The
commissioner may adopt rules under this
subchapter that require a sea urchins
processor to maintain records sufficient to
identify the point of origin of sea urchins
received by that processor.
2. Fisheries management. The commissioner
may adopt rules under chapter 607, subchapter
I to promote the conservation and propagation
of sea urchins. Those rules may include, but
are not limited to, limits on size of drags
used to take sea urchins, limits on the
nighttime dragging of sea urchins and
tolerance allowance for the harvesting of sea
urchins less than 2 inches in the longest
diameter.
3. Minimum size. Before January 1, 1994,
the commissioner shall adopt rules
establishing the method for determining
whether a sea urchin measures less than 2
inches in the longest diameter. If
necessary, the commissioner may use emergency
rule-making authority under chapter 607,
subchapter II to adopt rules under this
subsection.
In order to raise the funds required to successfully
manage the sea urchin resource, surcharges are assessed on
licenses purchased over a period of 3 years, § 6749-Q License
surcharges:
The following surcharges are assessed on
licenses sold for calendar years 1995, 1996
and 1997:
1. Hand fishing sea urchin license.
$160 on a sea urchin hand harvesting
license;
2. Sea urchin dragging license. $160 on
a sea urchin dragging license;
3. Sea urchin boat tender's license.
$35 on a sea urchin boat tender's license;
4. Wholesale seafood license with a sea
urchin buyer's permit. $500 on a wholesale
seafood license with a sea urchin buyer's
permit; and
5. Wholesale seafood license with a sea
urchin processor's permit. $2500 on a
wholesale seafood license with a sea
urchin processor's permit.
The commissioner shall deposit all
surcharges assessed in this section in the
Sea Urchin Research Fund established in
section 6749-R.
This article is repealed January 1i, 1999,
pursuant to 12 M.R.S.A. § 6749-T.
The Sea Urchin Research Fund was established in order to
determine what course of action the department should
undertake in managing the sea urchin fishery. § 6749-R Sea
Urchin Research Fund:
The Sea urchin Research Fund, referred to
in this section as the "fund," is established
in the department. Balances in the fund may
not lapse and must be carried forward and
used for the purposes of this section:
1. Uses of the fund. The commissioner
shall use the fund for research directly
related to sea urchin fishery management
information needs. The purpose of that
research must be to determine, with the
highest reliability possible given available
resources, the greatest level of effort that
may be applied to the sea urchin fishery
without harming the long-term economic and
biological sustainability of the sea urchin
fishery.
2. Sources of revenue. The fund is
capitalized by surcharges assessed under
section 6749-Q. In addition to those
revenues, the commissioner may accept and
deposit in the fund money from any other
source, public or private. All money in the
fund must be used for the purposes set forth
in this section.
3. Reports. The commissioner shall submit
an interim and a final report on expenditures
from the fund and research findings to the
joint standing committee of the Legislature
having jurisdiction over marine resource
matters. An interim report must be submitted
by July 1, 1996. A final report must be
submitted by January 1, 1998.
This article is repealed January 1, 1999,
pursuant to 12 M.R.S.A. § 6749-T.
In order to maintain the necessary information base for
the management of the sea urchin industry, the Legislature has
required that log books be kept by buyers and processors, §
6749-S Log books for sea urchin buyers and processors:
The commissioner shall adopt rules
requiring any person holding a wholesale
seafood license with a sea urchin buyer's
permit or a wholesale seafood license with a
sea urchin processor's permit to maintain a
log book. The rules must indicate the type
of data that must be recorded in the log
book, the manner for producing the log books
and the method for analyzing the data from
the log books. The commissioner shall charge
a fee for the log book that is sufficient to
recover all costs associated with the
production of the log book and analysis of
the data, except that any personnel and
operating costs associated with the log book
must be paid from allocations from the Sea
Urchin Research Fund. Fees received from the
department from the sale of log books are
dedicated revenue and must be used by the
department for the purposes of this section.
The log book and data analysis may be
produced and conducted by the department or
may be produced and conducted by a public or
private entity under contract with the
department. Disclosure of any data collected
under this section is subject to the
confidentiality provisions of section 6173.
This article is repealed January 1, 1999,
pursuant to 12 M.R.S.A. § 6749-T.
The privilege of engaging in activities involving the
dealing or processing of sea urchin parts within the State is
restricted in § 6851 Wholesale seafood license:
2-B. Wholesale seafood license with a sea
urchin buyer's permit. At the request of the
applicant, the commissioner shall issue a
wholesale seafood license with a sea urchin
buyer's permit. A person holding a wholesale
seafood license with a sea urchin buyer's
permit may engage in all the activities in
subsection 2 and may buy, sell, ship or
transport whole sea urchins. A license under
this subsection does not authorize a person
to engage in the processing of sea urchins or
to buy, sell, ship or transport sea urchin
parts.
2-C. Wholesale seafood license with a sea
urchin processor's permit. At the request of
the applicant, the commissioner shall issue a
wholesale seafood license with a sea urchin
processor's permit. A person holding a
wholesale seafood license with a sea urchin
processor's permit may engage in all the
activities in subsection 2 and may buy, sell,
process, ship or transport whole sea urchins
or sea urchin parts.
6. Fees. The fees are as follows:
A. $217 for a wholesale seafood license
or a wholesale seafood license with a lobster
permit, sea urchin buyer's permit or sea
urchin processor's permit.
There are concerns regarding the enforceability of the
zoning laws, however, because of the difficulty in catching a
boat harvesting outside of its licensed zone. If confronted,
the boat could simply claim that it was recreationally diving
or pursuing scallops. Even if it were caught, the penalties
involved are insignificant enough that the damages could be
recouped in a single day of work. There is currently an
effort underway in the Legislature to increase the penalty for
any infraction of the existing regulations to $500. Some
within the industry, however, feel that even a fine of this
size is insignificant in relation to the daily income from
catches.12
Kyle, B. "Urchin Harvesters Pack Hearing on Two Proposed Bills,"
Bangor Daily News, 30 January 1996, p. 1A.
Concerning the law on the maximum size of drag allowed in
harvesting, this does not address the type of drag involved,
thus allowing draggers to continue practicing indiscriminate
dragging techniques which are detrimental to the overall
health of the benthic environment. On the West Coast,
dragging for urchins is not allowed because of these harmful
effects. In addition, draggers often cull their catches away
from where urchins were removed, thus greatly reducing the
probability that those urchins will be able to rejoin the
reproduction process."3
13 Baldwin, L. "Rocky Reefs Yield New Treasure." Bangor Daily News,
20 May 1995, p. 1A.
Chapter III
The Trade of Exporting Sea Urchins
Biology and Reproduction of the Green Sea Urchin
Side View of Sea Urchin
Figure 4
The species of sea urchin harvested in Maine,
Strongylocentrotus droebachiensis, is called the green sea
urchin and is classified within the phylum Echinodermata,
subphylum Echinozoa, class Echinoidea. The organisms of this
phylum all are invertebrates with an internal skeleton,
comprised of 10 plates of calcite ossicles, chemically
composed of calcium carbonate. As adults, the rigid sea
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urchin skeleton, or test, exhibits a fivefold symmetry in its
discoid shape and has many spines extending outward which
protect it from predators and strain food from the water
column. Every other ossicle has openings between the spines
which allow tube feet to extend out and capture food, provide
locomotion or hold on to the substrate.14 Figure 5 below shows
a basic diagram of the exterior of a sea urchin.
Plan View of Sea Urchin Exterior (bottom)
Figure 5
14 Sea Grant Extension Program Publication, California Sea Grant
College Program: University of California Cooperative Extension,
http://seaurchin.org/Sea-Grant-Urchins.html/, April 1995.
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Within this skeleton resides a system of fluid-filled
vessels radiating out from the upper pole of the test, down
the interior walls of the main body cavity, or coelom, to the
ring at the lower pole of the test, called the madreporite.
This vascular systems serves several essential purposes
for the organism, including locomotion, feeding and sensory
perception. Along the walls of the water vascular system
within the coelom are numerous tube feet which are used for
locomotion, capturing food, sensory perception and
respiration. As shown in Figure 6 below, these tube feet may
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be in contact with the exterior surroundings by extending
through the ossicles.
Spawning occurs at various times, depending on many
oceanographic environmental factors, and may commence as soon
as February, but predominantly occurs during the months of
March and April. It is thought that chemical cues are
responsible for the onset of reproduction, since this occurs
nearly spontaneously among a given population."5 The urchins
must be congregated in a sufficiently dense population so that
the sperm and eggs can couple; studies of the red sea urchin
on the West Coast show that sperm released from males are only
active for a few minutes.16 Thus the spontaneous emission of
gametes within a sufficiently dense population of urchins
increases the chances of successful reproduction. Naturally,
the urchins have their lowest roe content after spawning has
occurred, during the months of May, June and July.
As larvae, urchins are microscopic and drift for six to
eight weeks before reaching sufficient size to drop out of the
water column. At this stage, they are very sensitive to
temperature, bacteria and pollutants; the eggs do not develop
well in temperatures above 500 F but can withstand
temperatures slightly below 320 F. Upon falling to the sea
floor, the larvae quickly change to small juvenile sea urchins
of only one or two millimeters in diameter and begin foraging
on whatever food is available in the vicinity. If they are
not consumed as prey during this vulnerable stage of their
lives, they can reach diameters of up to 2 inches and sexual
15 Harris, Larry. Personal Communication. 15 February, 1996.
16 Sea Grant Extension Program Publication, University of California
Cooperative Extension.
maturity in three to four years.'7 It is generally thought
that urchins reach sexual maturity at a size of about 1-1i
inch body diameter, although research elsewhere suggests that
maturation is dependent on geographic characteristics of an
area, such as the amount of light and nutrients fostering the
growth of kelp, their main source of food. As many nutrients
are carried and deposited by the water column, the amount of
water flow past the population site is also a significant
factor in the vitality of the benthic environment and thus the
urchin population. Where urchin populations are particularly
dense, competition for food may restrict the amount of roe
that develops in the urchins, thus making them less desirable
for marketing."8
Larry Harris of the University of New Hampshire has
carried out research into the effects of environmental
conditions on the settlement, recruitment and growth of green
sea urchins. One finding was that populations become
increasingly sparse in deeper waters, yet the survival beyond
three months may increase with depth for an individual
organism. While their growth rates are highly variable,
depending on the availability of nutrients in the benthic
region, those urchins whose diets were omnivorous were most
robust in growth, although their roe was not as high in
quality as kelp-fed urchins."9
Urchins are known to have eaten whole forests of kelp in
17 Chenowith, S. The Green Sea Urchin Fishery in Maine. (Boothbay
Harbor, ME: Maine Department of Marine Resources, 1994), p. 6.
18 Baxter, p. 4.
19 Lannin, J. "Invasion of Sea Urchins 'a Plague,'" Maine Sunday
Telegram, 20 July, 1986, 15A.
coastal California waters, and have eaten kelp as a component
of their diet in Maine as well, particularly that of a type
known as laminaria. As a population of urchins approaches a
region of kelp growth on a ledge uprising, they progressively
move upward gaining mass as they consume more kelp. As such,
their roe content is greater and because of the beta-Carotene
rich kelp diet, which is responsible for the bright-yellow
coloring prized by Japanese consumers, the roe is of higher
quality and therefore more valuable to the industry. The
immature urchins in lower depths continue to move into the
forest, reaching the "feed line", a conceptual demarcation of
the bottom just below a kelp bed, generally at a depth of 30
to 40 feet. In order to grow to sufficient size so that they
can successfully reproduce, it is thought that urchins must be
allowed to reach this level.20  One study found that urchins
in shallow waters had gonads which were larger and or better
quality than those of deeper waters, which is most likely
attributable to the availability of more and/or better food.2'
The organism's sexual organs or eggs, being the most
valued parts by the consumers, are ideally harvested at the
time of year when they comprise their maximum possible
percentage of total weight of the organism. This weight
standard, referred to as the roe standard by harvesters and
processors, is one of the driving criteria by which harvesters
decide when their activities are carried out during the
season. The growth of the urchin's reproductive organs is
20 Canfield, Clarke "Urchin Boom May Lead to Crash," Maine Sunday
Telegram, 22 December 1991, lB.
21 Kramer, D.E., and Nordin, D.M. Physical Data from a Study of Size,
Weight and Gonad QOuality for the Green Sea Urchin (Strongylocentrotus
droebachiensis) over a One-Year Period, p. 34.
thought to commence during the summer months after spawning
and continues to reach a maximum after late October or early
November."2 There was no significant correlation seen between
the coloration of the gonads and the time of year; however,
they were found to be darkened somewhat after spawning had
occurred, roughly from March to July.23 Coloration is thought
to be more of a function of the quality of diet accessible to
the urchins, as mentioned above. The urchins carry their
greatest value during that period when their roe content is
greatest, the color is brightest, and the texture is firmest.
This occurs for S. droebachiensis roughly during the winter
months in Maine, from November until March.24 The seasonal
variation in roe content has important implications for the
marketing aspect of exporting to Japan, as the period of least
supply by local Japanese harvesters coincides with the period
of greatest gonadal yield and supply in Maine.
Harvesting, Processing, and Exporting the Urchin Roe
The majority of sea urchin's harvested during the early
growth of the industry in Maine were brought to the surface
using dragging equipment similar to that used by scallop
draggers. This was largely due to the fact that their methods
are able to remove greater numbers of urchins in a given
amount of time than an equivalent number of urchin divers, and
22 Chenowith, p. 5.
Kramer, p. 38.
24 Chenowith, p. 3.
they are able to harvest areas that are inaccessible to divers
for safety reasons. Some urchins are damaged, however, during
the process of dragging over the bottom, either from the
weight of the equipment or from rocks being caught in the
drag. This damage reduces the likelihood that the urchins
will be acceptable to processors who depend on a high quality
product. Because draggers can only operate over relatively
flat areas of the ocean floor, they can only harvest those
urchins that eat various organic materials and algae floating
in the water column, a sub-optimal diet for value on the
consumer market. In subsequent seasons more divers have
acquired licenses for harvesting sea urchins, as shown in
Figure 7 below, but the number of both types of licenses has
declined in the last year due to the five-year moratorium on
issuing new licenses."
Diver and Dragger Licenses Issued, 1991 - 1994
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Figure 7
25 Creaser, Ted. Maine Department of Marine Resources. Personal
Communication. 25 March, 1996.
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Divers, on the other hand, use hand-held rakes to dislodge
the urchins from ledges and gather them into small piles before
placing those individuals that exceed the minimum size in net
bags which are tied to a buoy on the surface. When the bag is
full the diver tugs on the buoy, signaling to the dive tender
that it can be winched up to the surface. A sample of urchins
is taken from the catch and opened to discern the color of the
roe and thus determine if the rest of the catch will be
marketable.
There are efforts within the research community to develop
technologies which would avoid the harmful effects of drags on
the benthic environment. At Northeastern University, Dr. Susan
Goldhor is developing a technique where baiting could be used to
trap urchins until they are brought to the surface. Using
nuisance seaweed which washes up on beaches, Pilayella
littoralis, the researchers are testing various cage assemblies
with fishermen to test their effectiveness. Once caught, they
intend to hold the urchins, feeding them a diet of higher
quality nutrition in an effort to raise the roe content, and
thus the value, of the individuals.26 Trapping would most likely
only be an option in the summer months, after spawning has
occurred and the urchins have lost most of their mass. At this
time, they are more mobile, as they search more aggressively for
food in order to regain mass lost during reproduction.27
Another prospective method for bringing urchins to the
surface has been through the use of a suction device, a
26 "Increasing Income through New Technology Development for Sea Urchin
Industry," Commercial Fisheries News, October 1995, p. 3B.
Baxter B., and Chamberlain, B. The Harvest of Green Sea Urchins on
the Coast of Maine, (Boothbay Harbor, ME: Department of Marine
Resources, 1988), 5.
creation of Bruce Chamberlain's in Maine's Department of
Marine Resources." Using suction from compressed air created
by a boat's engine, urchins are forced to the surface through
a 6 inch diameter hose. This method, which can be reproduced
for under $1,000 or less, avoids damage to the urchins shell
which can occur as a result of the weight of a drag. Once an
urchin's shell is cracked and sea water gets inside, the value
to the Japanese consumer of the roe inside is lost.
Once the urchins are brought to the shore, they are
either sold directly to a processor operating in the harbor or
sold to a dealer who arranges for their overland transport to
a processor within a day. The urchins are then sampled again
by the processors and sorted by quality before either being
sent to be processed directly or placed in storage, depending
on operational conditions in the facility. They are then
opened either manually by using a hand-tool to ply the test
apart, or by a conveyor-operated cutting machine that removes
the bottom portion of the test. Once opened, the gonads are
then removed using a spoon-like device by handlers who sort
the roe by color and place them on metal trays where a
preliminary washing by cold saltwater is done to remove any
bits of shell or other organic matter. A final cleaning is
then performed by handlers using tweezers to remove all
remaining foreign matter. The gonads are then placed in
stackable plastic containers and soaked in a cold saltwater
bath having a controlled concentration of a potassium solution
for between 15 minutes and an hour, until the roe becomes firm
28 Kreis, D.M. "Maine's New Cash Crop," Maine Times. 29 July 1988,
p. 27.
enough for shipment. The roe is then drained and placed in
small wooden trays (approx. 4"x6"xl") which are stacked and
tied in bundles of up to 15 trays. The bundles are then
bagged in plastic and refrigerated until final preparation for
shipment. At that time, the bundles are placed in insulating
cartons which are filled with an artificial coolant. From the
processing center, the urchins are trucked to the airport in
Boston and flown directly to the Japanese market in Tokyo.
From landing on the wharf to arrival in Japan, the processing
and shipment of the urchin roe takes six to seven days.29
As the scale of a processor's operation continues to
grow, the amount of wasted product, that lost or damaged
during extraction becomes increasingly important. In the
first few years of large scale exporting from Maine after
1987, the urchins were packed and shipped whole to the
factories in Japan for processing, at a cost of approximately
$1.50 per pound. In order to survive the trip, they were
packed in specially insulated cartons at 300 Fahrenheit.
After processing at the Japanese plants, 90% or more of the
urchin shipment, by weight, is discarded as waste from normal
processing operations but also from the rejection of roe that
is unacceptable to the Japanese market. Obviously this was an
area where costs could be reduced by processing the urchin
domestically, saving much of the weight from being
transported. In order to do this however, another cultural
difficulty would have to be accounted for: the long-standing
consumer loyalty exhibited by the Japanese towards processing
houses in Japan which have been in operation for many
29 Turgeon, Kathy. Personal Communication at I.S.F. Trading, Inc.
21 March, 1996.
generations under the ownership of a family claiming the
highest quality roe.30
In response to this, the Japanese started setting up
processing centers in the United States, two of them located
within the state of Maine. Along with processing centers of
domestic ownership, the trend has reversed to the point where
the great majority of the valued roe is extracted from the
urchins before shipment to overseas markets. Now that much of
the processing activities are carried out locally, there is
more focus on how these activities can be carried out with
minimal investment in man-hours and loss of product due to
damage during extraction. There are currently efforts
underway to increase the utilization of automated roe-
extraction machines in processing centers. Currently, there
are four sites within Maine where these machines are being
used and negotiations are under way for the sale of these
machines to processors in California, South Africa and Chile.31
One of the greatest concerns in the processing of the
urchins is the amount of product lost as a result of breakage
to the roe during extraction and discards which are found to
be of substandard quality for marketing in Japan. It is
estimated that 60 percent or more of the urchins removed from
the ocean are lost during one of the many steps in harvesting,
processing and shipping to destinations.32
30 Austin, P. "In Japan's Seafood Market, Lowly Maine Sea Urchin
is a $100-a-Pound Steal," Maine Times, 7 September, 1990, p. 12.
31 Stevens, L. "Cutting Machine 'Revolutionizes' Urchin Processing,"
Commercial Fisheries News, December 1994, p. 7B.
Austin, P. "Sea Urchin Fiasco Illustrates Failure of State Policy,"
Maine Times, 5 March, 1993, p. 3.
Growing Pains for the Industry
As the industry increases in its scale of operation,
conflicts are certain to arise between competitors at various
levels of the export process. During the fall of 1995, there
were concerns raised by a group of urchin processors,
represented by the Maine Sea Urchin Processors Association,
that unfair practices were being employed by out-of-state
processors. It is alleged that processors based in New York
were bidding up wharf prices for urchins in Maine to levels
where Maine-based processors could not compete. They are able
to do this, it is alleged, by employing Asian immigrant labor
through "temporary" agencies, paying them cash at wages well
below the minimum levels required by law. An investigation
into the allegations has been initiated by the Maine Attorney
General's Office along with U.S. Immigration authorities.33
In addition to conflicts between competing urchin
processors, there have been disputes between the harvesters
and dealers within the state resulting from the instability of
urchin prices at the wharves. Urchin draggers and divers
initiated a strike over allegations that prices were being
held at artificially low levels upon the opening of the
state's northern harvesting zone in early fall. Wharf prices
dropped from $1.25 per pound to 70 cents, with occasional bids
at a paltry 25 cents for a pound during the first few open
days of the northern zone. Prices were sustained at levels
above $1.00 in the state's southern zone. Even during the
middle of a zone's open period, bidding wars would
33 Baldwin, L. "Urchin Processor's Claims Prompt U.S., State Probe,"
Bangor Daily News, 19 October 1995, p. 1A.
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occasionally break out where prices would fluctuate from $3.00
to as low as 40 cents per pound.34
Dealers contended that the slide in prices is merely a
result of a stretch of good weather, which allows more days at
sea for the harvesters, and decreased demand from Japan. As a
result, harvesters asserted that the lower prices encouraged
the extraction of more urchins than would normally occur in an
effort to make up for the loss of revenue. As a parallel
effect of bringing in a greater number of urchins, the quality
of the product would be diminished because of less selective
harvesting efforts, thereby exacerbating the downward trend in
prices. It was argued, the benchmark price of $1.00 per pound
would be a form of conservation measure, ensuring the economic
viability of a harvesters day at sea under normal conditions.
The issue was resolved after eight days when the divers and
draggers agreed with dealers on a minimum bid price of $1.00
per pound for urchins containing a minimum of 10% roe by
weight.35
This experience of discord between the dealers and the
harvester's brings to light one of the strategic problems
encountered in the export of sea urchins. Because of the high
dependence of the roe's value upon its perceived quality by the
dealers in Japan, attempts by Maine harvesters to export
substandard roe in an effort to maintain a certain volume of flow
could have damaging consequences on the future working
relationship between the agents. This effect would be in
addition to the lost revenue from spending time at sea harvesting
34 Baldwin, L. "Sea Urchin Divers Seek $1 a Pound," Bangor Daily
News, 13 October 1995, p. 1A.
35 Baldwin, L. "Sea Urchin Harvesters End Strike," Bancor Daily News,
19 October 1995, p. 1B.
urchins rejected by dealers at the wharves, by processors who
reject urchins during preparation. If the substandard product
makes it to the market in Japan, the processor incurs the
additional cost of shipping the roe. During the 1987/88 season,
it was estimated that the industry received revenue for only one
of every ten urchins harvested.36 While there is no doubt that
this inefficiency in the process has been diminished as the
industry moves along the learning curve, harvesters must remain
educated of the damaging consequences indiscriminate harvesting
will have on the future competitiveness of the industry.
Another factor in the volatility of the market is the
exchange rate between the dollar and the Japanese yen. With the
dollar relatively low compared to the yen, the cost of shipping
overseas has been held in check, despite continuously increasing
fees charged by airlines for shipping. According to Chris Duffy
of the University of New Hampshire, if the dollar were to rise
while other currencies where urchins are exported to Japan remain
stable, the cost of shipping could increase beyond the range of
economic viability for American exporters.37 Trade agreements
with other nations may also upset the balance that supports the
export season in Maine. For example, in 1987 the former Soviet
Union and Japan entered into a trade agreement which disrupted
the demand for urchins from Maine. By increasing the number of
destinations where urchins are shipped, such as to European and
other Asian countries, fluctuations in the demand of urchins from
Japan can be buffered so as to have a smaller impact on the
harvesters and processors operating in Maine.
36 Baxter, p. 1.
37 Kreis, p. 27.
Chapter IV
Sea Urchins as a Finite, Renewable,
Common Property Resource
Introduction to Hardin's "Tragedy of the Commons"
Who owns the air we breath? Or the water we drink? As
resources which do not readily accept being confined to any
border of space, it can be argued that they do not fall under
the ownership of any one individual. Rather, because they are
utilized by all of the individuals comprising a population,
they are referred to as collective resources, that is,
resources which are considered the common property of the
general population. As our technology grows increasingly able
to alter the environment around us, the barriers which
previously prevented us from harnessing the benefits offered
by these resources fall, and as a consequence, those resources
no longer remain free to all in equal measure but instead are
bestowed upon those having access to the technology which
makes the beneficial properties of that common resource
available at all. Examples can be considered for many common
property resources: dams that contain the water in rivers,
factories and vehicles that consume the air we breathe, signs
and other messages carried by visual media that infiltrate our
sight, noise from various activities that assaults our ears,
minerals and rare elements that are mined, trees on government
land that are harvested, and living resources in the sea that
are caught for food. All of these common resources were
brought under the domain of a certain number of individuals
through the application of technology. Those who had access
to the technology are able to use the common resource for
their own purposes, taking some unit of benefit that they
alone receive while the owners of the resource, the general
public, receives no direct compensation for the unit depletion
of their resource.
This idea of the utilization of common property resources
has been discussed in an article by Garret Hardin, entitled
The Tragedy of the Commons.34  In this article, a situation is
described wherein there exists a finite population of a common
resource, a field for example, where a certain number of
agents use the common resource for their own purpose by
herding their cattle on it, to continue with the example of
the field as a common resource. In order to gain the greatest
benefit from the field, each herder will try to maximize the
number of cattle that he can graze on the field. In
considering the benefit that he will gain by adding one
additional animal to his herd, he realizes that he will gain
one corresponding unit of benefit entirely to himself. On the
negative side, he realizes the incremental damage that this
animal will inflict upon the field, but this negative impact
is shared between all of the agents who are using the field to
graze their cattle. Thus that particular herder sees the
negative impact as detracting only a fraction of the positive
benefit resulting from the animal's grazing activity. Seeing
Hardin, G. "The Tragedy of the Commons." Science 162 (13 December,
1968): p. 1243-1248.
this result, the herder can thus rationalize that he may add
additional animals to his herd, gaining the benefits from the
increase while allowing the detrimental effects to be shared
among himself and his fellow herders.
The problem arises when all of the other herdsmen utilize
the same logic, so that they increase the number of animals in
their own herds, realizing the benefit individually while
allowing the detriment to be shared generally. At this point,
the "tragedy" is realized, where the freedom of each
individual to add an animal to his herd contributes to the
collective degradation of the resource when the detrimental
effects are aggregized over all the herdsmen. As long as the
field is large enough to provide for the amount of cattle
grazing on it, there is no problem with the situation; but
when the carrying capacity of the field is reached by all of
the herdsmen taken together, either there will be a voluntary
limitation by the herdsmen of the size of their herds or there
will be a natural failure of the herd to sustain itself on the
limited land available.
Correlation to the Sea Urchin Industry
The translation of this hypothetical situation to the sea
urchin industry is straightforward. Sea urchins, found in the
environment of the coastal waters and under the jurisdiction
of the state, are a common property resource. As such, they
are under the stewardship of the state government, in turn
representing the ultimate owners of the resource: the citizens
of the state of Maine. The fishermen who harvest the sea
urchins are the agents utilizing the resource in order to earn
a living. While they are the agents who actually remove the
urchins from the natural habitat, the various people
associated with the processing and exporting of sea urchins
should be considered equal partners in realizing the benefits
that result from the utilization of the common property
resource; without either of these agents, the market value
associated with the sea urchins could not be gained at all.
The citizens of the state, including of course those agents
involved in the various aspects of bringing the urchins to the
market, are the ultimate owners of the resource and thus have
a stake in ensuring that the vitality of the population is
maintained for succeeding generations who will need the
resource in order to earn their living as well as for the
health of the coastal ecosystem in general.
In light of this situation, a balance must be reached
where the immediate interests of the current agents are
recognized while not curtailing the future market potential of
the resource. A traditional response to this need for
temperance of current utilization would be to resort to
administrative statute in order to restrict participation in
the harvest, the methods allowed by the harvesters, or some
other measure to limit the removal of urchins from coastal
waters. Such an approach is often met with the ire of the
people to whom it is directed, as it is being imposed from a
governing body which resides outside of the culture which is
directly affected by the decrees. Such prohibitive rulings
are often seen as being unfair to the unique cultural setting
in which the activities are carried out. In this case, the
coastal fishing communities of Maine have a strong history of
independence developed through many generations over the years
of hard work in the rugged ocean environment. Any attempt by
people outside of the community to impose restrictions on
their way of life is met as an assault on their traditional
ways of earning a living.
To their credit, the people who have been harvesting the
various fisheries have been able to maintain their way of life
for many years. Yet the incremental changes in technology
over recent decades and the resulting influence on the
increased scale of harvesting activities must be acknowledged.
Traditional attitudes toward the oceans as unlimited sources
of living resources have to be reconciled with the greater
freedom provided by new technologies which allow fishermen
greater range and time out at sea. The recognition of
necessity for this change must emerge from within the
population of agents in order for the corrective course of
action to have any acceptance over a significant period of
time. The challenge is to devise a system whereby the
authority in limiting the action of the agents is born of and
respected by the equal participation of the agents themselves.
Modeled after the democratic institutions devised by this
country, in combination with the traditional significance of
local town meetings in Maine, such an authority could operate
as a ruling council recognized within the industry as
promoting the long-term stability of the resource.
The willingness of the agents to abide by the limits
imposed on the resource is one of the biggest obstacles to the
successful management of the resource. An individual faced
with the decision of complying with the limits imposed on
their activities will face what is referred to in Hardin's
article as the double bind: if the person doesn't comply, he
is openly condemned by the population for not acting
responsibly; if that person does comply, he is condemned as a
simpleton while the rest of the population takes advantage of
the commons. This bind, however, dissolves away when it is
recognized that the limitations apply to all participants in
equal measure, as mutually agreed upon restrictions.
The perception of a loss of freedom by that individual
may be transformed into a recognition that this sacrifice in
the short term will lend itself to greater freedom in the long
term, showing itself in non-marketable commodity called option
value. Option value is the existence of future freedom in
choosing future courses of action in regards to the management
of the resource. For example, the decline of groundfish
species in the Northeast fisheries, as demonstrated in Figure
8 below,
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8 was a result of many years of overfishing in an area where
there was no control exerted by the population over who had
access to the stocks and how much of that stock they could
remove.35
Before passage of the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and
Management Act by the U.S. Congress in 1976, there was an
unbridled effort to catch fish in the richest areas of the
coast of New England because foreign fishing vessels were
established in the region and showed no concern for preserving
any of the stocks to ensure reproduction. With the foreign
vessels removed from within the 200-mile limit and no other
effective conservation measures in place, the domestic fishing
fleet invested much money in equipment which allowed
harvesting and processing activities to occur on a larger
scale than was possible with the foreign competition in place.
Essentially, the open access to the fishing stocks by the
domestic fleet continued the problem to where, according to
one fisherman, "Nobody wants to forego an income in the
present if they're not going to benefit in the future. People
don't see the benefit of investing in conservation in an open
access fishery."36
The delay in acting to preserve the resource resulted in
a catastrophic loss of option value when there was no choice
left but to close the most productive areas of George's Bank
fishery entirely to further harvesting. A lawsuit filed by
the Conservative Law Foundation in 1991 to halt the further
decline of fishing stocks resulted in Amendment 5 being
35 "Fishing in New England by the Numbers," Boston Globe, 11 December
1994, p. 53.
36 Pollack, S. "Finding a Fix for Northeast Groundfish," National
Fisherman, November 1990, p. 12.
implemented by the New England Fishery Management Council.
This calls for a 10% decrease in fishing mortality each year
for five years, yet some scientists say that even this will
not be enough to allow stocks to replenish. Total closure of
the areas is being recognized by many as the only way to
ensure that stocks are able to recover. According to the
chief scientist at Northeast Fisheries Center in Woods Hole,
Massachusetts, "They've refused to bite the bullet for the
last 15 years, and now it's over." Now the only option being
considered is how to limit access to the stocks, and in this
effort, a boat buy-back program has been implemented in order
to encourage people to leave the industry, for many fishermen,
the only way of life they have known.37 This experience
demonstrates that by preserving the option value of a
resource, future market value may be realized on a consistent
basis, albeit on a necessarily smaller level than at those
enjoyed in the years when the available technology didn't
allow harvesting to occur on a scale that threatened the
continued existence of the various groundfish populations.
In order to implement these necessary limitations on the
level of harvesting activities, Hardin calls for "mutual
coercion mutually agreed upon by the majority of the people
affected." Coercive forces in the form of fines have been a
traditional tool in punishing those participants who do not
abide by the rules established by a legislative body. But
this approach can have the opposite of its intended effect
when the person who paid the fine tries to recoup the
financial losses by exerting an even greater pressure on the
37 Kelley, K. "New England Deals with the Latest Bad News about
Groundfish," National Fisherman, November 1994, p. 18.
resource. Instead of fostering a spirit of cooperation among
the agents in limiting the harvesting activities of the
resource, the effect is to emphasize the perceived importance
of gaining the benefit of harvesting the resource as soon as
possible so that revenues can be accrued in order to offset
penalties which are assessed as a necessary cost of doing
business. The resulting situation is a stalemate among
possible cooperators who would be willing to abide by the
agreed upon rules if assurance could be obtained that other
participants would respect the rules as well.
Application of Game Theory to the Problem
At this point, it would be instructive to look at the
guidelines that game theory provides in such a situation where
a limited number of participants in an activity are faced with
the choice of either cooperating with each other in pursuing
long-term gain or defecting from the rules in an attempt to
attain a short-term profit. The most simple example entails
an activity where there are only two participants in a
scenario, referred to as the Prisoner's Dilemma. In this
situation, both participants are faced with a decision to
either cooperate with each other in abiding by the rules of a
situation or defect in pursuit of immediate short-term gain.
There are variable returns for each decision, depending on how
the other person faced with that same set of choices responds.
Each participant does not know in advance how the other person
is going to respond to the choice, but does know the results
that entail the possible combination of responses. The
possible combinations are represented in the matrix of Figure
9 below.
Participant 2
Cooperate
Cooperate
Participant 1
Defect
Defect
Payoff Matrix for Prisoner's Dilemma
Figure 9
From this figure it is seen that if both players
cooperate the payoff for both is the cooperator's reward, CR =
3 points, while if they both defect the payoff is the
defector's penalty, DP = 1 point each. If one player defects
while the other player cooperates, however, the payoff is
greater for the player who defects, so that person gets the
defector's reward, DR = 5 points, while the other player
receives no points at all; he has been taken advantage of by
cooperating with a defector and gets the cooperator's penalty,
CP = 0 points. From this situation, it would seem that each
participant's best interest would be to defect, in order to
minimize losses should the other player defect as well. With
no future consequences to consider in making the decision, the
payoff for defection is guaranteed to result in at least one
point, while cooperating has the possibility of being stuck
with no points at all. There is no value given at all to
future conditions which would result from the participants'
individual choices, thus there is no accountability for a
participant's decision. This would reflect an economic
situation where the discount rate, the preference of gaining
payoffs in the current situation relative to payoffs which may
result in the future, is near unity. Obviously such a
condition cannot exist, as there are always future
consequences with which to deal for past behaviors, so the
Prisoner's Dilemma should be iterated over several meetings
between unique participants, where a memory is retained of how
each participant has behaved in previous encounters.
In carrying out these iterated encounters, the strategy
that each participant employs becomes very important in
determining how the relationship evolves. For example, if a
participant demonstrates a strategy of always cooperating
regardless of how the other player responds, then the best
outcome for the other participant would be to defect on each
encounter, since there is no penalty for doing so. If the
other participant initially cooperates but responds to a
defection with a defection on the ensuing encounter, then the
reduced payoff for defection might serve as an incentive for
the original defector to cooperate on the next encounter. In
this case, it is in the interest of both participants to
cooperate so as to both receive the modest payoffs on a
consistent basis into the future.
The success or failure of various strategies was
investigated in a tournament carried out by Robert Axelrod at
the University of Michigan in the late 1970's. Different
strategies were submitted by people all over the country and
entered into a series of round-robin encounters, where all
strategies were matched against each other in successive head-
to-head Prisoner's Dilemma meetings. Each match-up consisted
of a finite but random number of individual encounters between
opposing strategies where the cumulative payoffs for each
strategy was recorded. These totals were added up over all of
the match-ups and examined. Of all the strategies submitted,
it turned out that the simplest of them, a strategy named Tit-
for-Tat, fared best when all of the encounters were considered
over the whole tournament. This strategy starts by always
cooperating initially, and then mirrors the other player's
response for the remainder of the turns, repaying a defection
with a defection and cooperation with cooperation. Because it
always is one step behind in following a defection, it is
never ahead in an individual match-up. However, because the
scenario is not a zero-sum situation, it is possible for one
participant to gain points without taking them away from the
other participant. By being able to create situations where
mutual cooperation evolves with many of the various
strategies, Tit-for-Tat avoids situations where mutual
defection occurs; such protracted reprisals among other
strategies were sufficient to lower their point totals when
summed up over the entire tournament.
When this outcome is integrated with the concept of
evolution over successive generations where those with higher
point totals are more prosperous and thus leave more offspring
to carry on the traits of their successful strategy, it
becomes likely that those strategies that foster cooperation
will grow in number. The conditions under which this
progression occurs most successfully are desired when a system
is being constructed which will manage the interaction among a
number of participants who are seeking to ensure their future
survival. While the participants seek to better their own
living conditions, they must do so in concert with others who
desire the same outcome.
From the results of the tournament, it is seen that if
participants meet repeatedly, recognize one another and retain
some knowledge of their previous encounters, then cooperation
may ensue."3 These are the conditions that allow a population
of mutual cooperators to exist in a stable relationship within
their community. Such conditions require that the population
of participants must be closed, and if not closed, that
mobility is sufficiently limited so that repeated encounters
may occur.
Axelrod, R. The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: HarperCollins
Publishers, 1984), p. 68.
Stability of a Population
Whether or not a population of mutual cooperators can
withstand the intrusion of participants who exploit the
commons is of interest as it suggests the ability of the
population to maintain its health as elder members retire and
new members are allowed in to replace them. A strategy of
cooperation between participants is collectively stable if no
other strategy can successfully enter the population of
participants and be able to flourish to such an extent that
the other cooperative strategies are no longer feasible.
For example, if a new strategy is introduced to the
population, it will be interacting with those cooperating
members and in doing so may be able to take advantage of their
behavior individually, gaining benefits by this approach which
are greater than the average gained by other cooperating
members interacting among themselves; while other strategies
are cooperative and gain a payoff of 3 amongst themselves, the
defector gains 5 as long as it can keep meeting participants
who have not encountered this strategy of defection. This
strategy will not be able succeed if there are enough future
interactions where the members of the population identify the
defector and engage that individual in mutual defections, thus
decreasing the payoff to 1 until that defecting individual
does not have the resources to continue. This is reflected in
the fact that if the discount rate mentioned earlier in the
chapter is small enough, that is, each member of the
population knows that there are enough future interactions so
that uncooperative actions will be punished, then no strategy
will be able to invade and thrive within a population of
mutual cooperators."
If a population of participants employing a strategy of
Tit-for-Tat is to be collectively stable, then the realized
payoffs for various behaviors must be stated clearly and be
known and understood by all of the participants. This implies
a degree of information among the participants that is assumed
in the setting of game theory to be perfect. Obviously such a
condition cannot be met in real life situations, but there are
measures that can be employed by the managing authorities
where this deficiency can be compensated. This matter will be
considered in the context of the sea urchin industry in the
next chapter, but for now, consideration will be given to the
relative values of the payoffs and their collective influence
on the necessary value of the discount rate for a population
to be collectively stable.
For the purposes of the discussion with respect to game
theory, an alternative definition of the discount rate will be
employed. The discount parameter is defined to be the value
that a participant will give to the possible payoffs of the
next decision relative to the value of those same payoffs
faced in the current decision. So if the payoffs of the next
round are only worth half as much as those payoffs gained in
the current round, then the discount parameter would be ½.
Thus it is similar to the discount rate in that it is a
measure denoting how much future payoffs are discounted
relative to current payoffs; the discount rate, however,
expresses the same sort of discounting of future payoffs, only
in a different mathematical setting. Briefly, the discount
rate, d, is shown most simply in the following mathematical
Ibid., p. 58.
statement expressing the perceived present value, PV, of
future benefits, B, (or costs) to a person:
PV = B / (1 + d)t.
In the scenario considered earlier, the payoffs
corresponding with the possible outcomes were CR = 3 for
mutual cooperation, CP = 0 for cooperating with a defector, DR
for exploiting a cooperator and DP = 1 for mutual defection.
It has been shown by Axelrod that if the valuation of future
conditions is great enough (the discount parameter is great
enough), then a population of participants employing the Tit-
for-Tat strategy cannot be successfully invaded. He showed
that this value of the discount parameter is the greater of
the following formulations:
(DR - CR)/(DR - DP) or (DR - CR)/(CR - CP).40
Inserting the values used in the above example, the values
would be:
(5 - 3)/(5 - 1) = ½ and (5 - 3)/(3 -0) = 2/.
So the smallest discount parameter that could be employed and
still maintain a population of cooperators is 2/, under the
payoff values assumed above. This underscores the importance
of maintaining penalties at significant levels and applying
them when the first traces of uncooperative behavior emerge.
If it is apparent to a participant that other members of the
population are not going to be present in subsequent rounds,
for reasons of either weakness or voluntarily, then the
40 Ibid., p. 207.
apparent discount parameter falls because the structure of
reciprocal relationships will not be maintained. This failure
of reciprocal relationships can be seen in many different
fields, from politics to business, where outgoing members may
lose clout and thus cooperative relationships among other
members.
The Physical Space of Cooperation
If the population is to maintain the reciprocally
cooperative behavior among its members, it is necessary for
each of the members to understand that their inter-
relationships are going to be durable, that they will be held
accountable for their behavior by others at a time in the
future when they meet again. This can best be accomplished by
controlling the size and composition of the population and
ensuring that the frequency of interaction is great enough
that those who do fail to behave cooperatively are confronted
and penalized promptly. A prompt retribution of significant
proportion will ensure that the penalties have a present value
which weighs significantly on their current behavior as well
as communicating with certainty as to why the sanctions are
being imposed on that individual. If there is too much time
in penalizing a defector, then the possibility exists that
that participant will receive the wrong message in the mean-
time: that defections will not be penalized and thus gains may
be made by breaking the rules. By waiting longer, this
deviant behavior can be reinforced after repeated rounds with
no intervention. Having paid the penalties for their
behavior, however, the defectors will be allowed to continue
their activities utilizing a strategy in compliance with the
rules agreed upon by the population.
As it does so, the other members must be able to
recognize this person and recall their past behavior so that
they can amend the tone of the interaction in accordance with
the strategy of Tit-for-Tat, repaying defection and
cooperation with the appropriate respective response. The
maintenance of frequent interactions will both help members
recognize each other and keep them apprised of their records
of behavior, allowing those who have changed from defective to
cooperative behavior to inform their neighbors of the fact so
that they may alter their responses to these reformed members
in keeping with the principle of reciprocity espoused by the
Tit-for-Tat strategy.4 1
The shared experiences of the members of a population in
interacting with their immediate neighbors fosters a
familiarity of members with each other in subgroups within the
population. Clusters of participants who frequently come in
contact obtain information on how their neighbor is behaving,
and if this behavior is appropriate, it may serve as a role
model for members who in the past attempted defections
periodically. The familiarity with neighbors to which human
participants can attain is a feature which also may avert one
of the unfortunate characteristics of a strict Tit-for-Tat
strategy. If a defection occurs, real or apparent, accidental
or by intention, the immediate reprisal can have the
unintended effect of initiating a series of defections
Sigmund, K. Games of Life (London: Oxford University Press, 1993),
p. 203.
alternated with cooperation.42
This "echo effect" can be averted by introducing a small
amount of consistent leniency in the strategy, as was done by
a deviation of Tit-for-Tat which allowed for two defections by
a participant before reprisals were enacted. This strategy,
called Tit-for-Two-Tats, avoided the costly retaliatory
strings but in subsequent rounds was found to be susceptible
to strategies which exploited this forgiveness by defecting
once and then cooperating in a periodic fashion.43 Familiarity
with neighbors such as that which occurs between human
participants, allows the participant to employ a strategy of
appropriate leniency depending upon the circumstances of the
situation. In doing this, however, it is of utmost importance
that both the strategy and the reasoning for employing the
strategy is communicated to the neighbor in an unambiguous
manner. This will alleviate any suspicions of ulterior
motives that may be harbored by the neighbor. The simplicity
and clarity of the variations of the Tit-for-Tat rules
facilitates this communication.
This clear understanding of consequences for deviant
behavior is one of the keys to ensuring the stability of
cooperative behavior. This, in turn, depends upon the fact
that the punishment for deviant behavior is sufficient enough
to deter that action should it appear as a strategy by a
participant. In general, any feasible expected payoffs can be
maintained in an equilibrium as long as each participant has
Poundstone, W. Prisoner's Dilemma (New York: Doubleday, 1992), p.
243.
Axelrod, p. 120.
an expected payoff, through cooperation, at least as large as
what would be guaranteed if all other participants colluded to
defect on that one participant.44 If all participants are told
by all others to stick to the agreed upon cooperative behavior
or else the entire population will impose the punishment, then
no single player has any incentive to deviate.
This is the basic condition for what is known as a Nash
equilibrium, with the relationships between the participants
being strategically stable.45 Within the limited sense
provided in the setting of game theory (i.e., perfect
information, fixed player strategies) this equilibrium
situation provides a unique solution to the conditions and
strategies defined by the game scenario. So it turns out that
while game theory may be an interesting tool for theorists to
gain insights about the behavior of groups of individuals
acting self-interestedly in a closed population, the
applicability to real world situations is limited. From the
discussion above, general guidelines can be gained which may
useful to managers who are attempting to implement operational
constraints upon participants who are competing over scarce
resources.
Kreps, D. A Course in Microeconomic Theory (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 508.
45 Gibbons, R. Game Theory for Applied Economists (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 8.
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Chapter V
Managing Resources in a Closed Economy
Emerging World-View of the Spaceship Earth
At this point, a discussion of how the resources of the
community are to be utilized over time is necessary. This
will provide the basis upon which the concepts gained from
game theory may be applied. At the very core of this
discussion is the necessity of a change in world-view held by
the people who both consume products and prepare them for
consumption. This change has been described by Kenneth
Boulding as a change from viewing the earth and its resources
with a frontier mentality to one of a "spaceship mentality."45
The former mentality saw the environment as one that always
offered new spaces to move to after the current one was
depleted of utility to the inhabitants. From the dawn of
mankind's existence on earth, this has been a sufficient point
of view, and one that accurately reflected the conditions
under which mankind lived. As evolving technologies gradually
allowed people to move to increasingly harsher and more
distant regions from the cradle of Africa, the new
environments were surveyed for their resources and habitats
established where conditions were found to be favorable.
45 Boulding, K.E. "The Economics of the Coming Spaceship Earth." In
Valuing the Earth: Economics, Ecology, Ethics. Eds. Daly, H.E. and
Townsend, K.N. (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1993), p. 297.
Finally, with the completion, in only the last century, of the
policy of "manifest destiny" by the settlers in America, all
of the frontiers of the planet have been conquered and
settlements established where the environment is conducive to
the various economic activities required by the diversified
global economy.
With the growth and expansion of these activities across
the landscape, the harmful effects on the natural environment
can no longer be eluded, so we are faced with the task of
maintaining the environment so that our species may continue
living on the planet, our spaceship earth. In economic terms,
this transformation in our relationship to the natural
resources of the earth is from that of an open system, where
raw materials are continuously and indefinitely used as inputs
into a conversion process which provides outputs for
consumption, to that of a closed system, where the outputs of
all parts of the economic system are considered as inputs into
other parts of the system.
In keeping with the mentality of the open system
historically held by the various governmental organizations
across the globe, there has been a persistent goal of
maximizing the throughput of the economy. In other words it
has been a goal to enlarge the scope and rate at which
materials are converted from input materials to output
products for consumption by the populace. The measure of this
rate of conversion by a country is generally agreed to be the
gross national product, or GNP. With the diversification of
the economy, this measure has been amended to included non-
material products, or services, as well. Not included in this
measure, however, is the contribution to the economy provided
by naturally existing ecosystems. For example, a stand of
trees conserves soil and thus keeps waterways clean, provides
clean air as well as habitat for wildlife. The contribution
to GNP only occurs when the trees are harvested and sold as a
converted wood product. Even man-made disasters such as oil
spills are considered as benefits as they contribute to the
GNP because of the money spent on clean-up activities. GNP is
not a very good measure of economic health because of this
inability to distinguish costs and benefits as they relate to
the ecosystem.4 6 Nonetheless, the goal remains for the country
to maximize the GNP so as to allow the economy to continue to
grow, thus providing more wealth to be shared among the
constituents of the population within the economy.
Boulding points out that the closed system, in contrast,
holds as its goal the minimization of the throughput, or flow,
of materials within the economy. Instead of this measure,
other factors are considered of paramount importance in
determining the health of the economy, such as the nature,
quality, and diversity of the capital stocks within the
economy. These stocks would include knowledge and
environmental assets, but most importantly the members of the
population themselves, since they contribute substantially to
the production of goods and services, and these same
characteristics for capital stocks would be applied to the
states of their minds and bodies. It may be argued that flows
play a more significant role in contributing to the well being
of people than do stocks; this need not be contested in order
for the main tenets of a closed system economy to be applied,
46 Bartholomew, J.A., et. al. "Goals, Agenda, and Policy
Recommendations for Ecological Economics," In Ecological Economics.
Ed. R. Costanza. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), p. 11.
however, as the stocks available at a point in time determine
the capability of people to earn income and thus maintain
their well-being. As long as the stocks are maintained at
levels which are sufficient for future use, the flow of
resource usage through the economy can be minimized to as
great a degree as possible while still maintaining the quality
of life of the individuals consuming, or preparing for
consumption, the resource. Maintaining this quality of life
is the ultimate goal of any development strategy, yet it is
not possible beforehand to know what the future conditions
will be under a given level of usage. This idea can be
communicated in Figure 10 below:47
Well-being
Time
Possible Sustainable Development Paths
Figure 10
47 Adapted from Pearce, D.W. Economic Values and the Natural World.
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1993), p. 48.
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These different paths represent various possible outcomes
of a management strategy, where path A appears to be
sustainable, path B is not sustainable, although it might be
efficient under the circumstances, and path C is neither
sustainable nor sufficient to support the people utilizing the
resource. While it may be possible to detect signs of non-
sustainability on path C because of the declining well-being
at a relatively early stage, path B, which appears much the
same as A early on, suffers the same fate of decline, only at
a later time. Furthermore, once these signs of decline are
detected, it may be too late to reverse the effects. Because
of this, it is necessary to determine whether or not the
conditions of sustainable development are being met.
These conditions of sustainability that hold the key to
the manager's ability to maintain the natural resource stocks
must therefore be discovered through research efforts which
seek to understand the dynamic linkages between the various
components of the local ecosystem in which that particular
resource resides.48 Understanding the linkages and
incorporating them into a model of the local ecosystem would
help the manager determine the scale of resource usage, one of
the keys related to sustainability. The scale of conversion
of a resource refers to the size of the flow of depletion
relative to the amount available in the environment (the
natural stock) left for usage at a later time. In the case of
the sea urchin industry, the scale would refer to the number
of urchins removed from Maine's coastal waters in a unit of
time relative to the number left in the environment which will
be able to reproduce. If the industry is to be able to
48 Pearce, p. 50.
maintain itself indefinitely, then the rate at which urchins
are removed must be no greater than the regeneration rate at
which urchins are able to replenish their population. As long
as there is any uncertainty over the stock level necessary to
sustain the population against harvesting activities, the
managers should err on the side of caution until there is
strong evidence from the research that a greater scale of
extraction can be safely supported.4
Determining the Value of a Natural Resource
When considering how the resources of a closed system are
to be allocated, a distinction can be made between those
people who will be using the resource in the immediate future
and those who will be inheriting the resource for use in later
generations. These two general areas of concern may be
referred to as intra-generational and inter-generational
valuation, respectively. By considering only the interests
and values of the current generation, there is a biasing of
those same concerns which will likely be faced by future
generations unless there is some mechanism whereby those
issues will be accounted for in the decisions made today.
It is common practice for members of the business
community to discount future costs and revenues associated
with a prospective activity by a certain factor, the discount
rate mentioned earlier, because of the inflationary nature of
currency in the economy, opportunity costs which arise from
having capital unavailable for other economic uses, and
Bartholomew, p. 17.
uncertainty about what future conditions will exist for
economic activity which will utilize a particular resource.
Depending upon the outcome of their analyses, it is possible
to determine whether an activity can be carried out in a
profitable manner.
As a necessary step in calculating the cash flows that
are expected from an economic activity, assumptions are made
about the demand for a product to be offered for sale, and
thus for the amount of currency that a share of the
consumptive market will be willing to pay for the product. By
determining what price is likely to be attained per unit of a
product and how many units of that product can be moved to
market in a certain amount of time, future revenues can be
assessed, and through the process of discounting by an assumed
discount rate, the present value of that activity can be
estimated. Incorporating the estimated future costs that are
incurred by the individual in the course of the activity into
the discounting analysis, the net present value is attained.
This is a more complete formulation than that used earlier in
the discussion of the discount rate in that it includes both
revenues and costs associated with the use of a resource. The
formula used would thus be:
NPV = Ft [ (Rt - Ct) / (1 + d) t i
where Rt and Ct represent the estimated revenues and costs,
respectively, accrued by the individual engaging in the
activity, and d is the assumed discount rate. The summation
is over the period of time into the future that the individual
wishes to carry out his or her analysis. If the net present
value, NPV, of the activity is found to be positive then,
according to this formulation, it would be profitable for that
individual to engage in the activity; if the NPV is negative,
then it would not.
This whole process, however, is based upon assumptions
that individuals make of the consumer's willingness to pay.
In the case of the sea urchin industry, the Japanese consumer
is the ultimate determining factor of the willingness to pay,
which in turn is determined largely by the quality of the
urchin's roe. This price is, in effect, paid to all of the
participants in the chain of events which are necessary to
bring the roe in marketable form to the consumer. From the
Japanese wholesalers and retailers, to the American exporters
and processors, to the dock-side dealers in Maine, and finally
to the harvesters, the price ultimately determines whether the
resource is of more value extracted from its natural habitat
or left to perform its ecosystem function. In this scheme,
market prices provide an autonomous and voluntary mechanism
for expressing the best use of the resource. This efficiency
standard of resource use, in theory, results in a market
outcome which is satisfactory to all participants and provides
the greatest social gain; bidding for a pound of whole urchins
on the dock proceeds until an equilibrium is reached at which
there is no other allocation of that resource which will
provide a greater benefit to the harvester. Akin to Adam
Smith's invisible hand, this bidding process is purported
to yield the best, or most efficient, allocation of the
resource.
What this model fails to incorporate, however, is the
existence of negative externalities of the use of a particular
resource upon third parties who are not directly involved in
the bidding process. These negative externalities may take
the form of a degraded ecosystem, where the general public is
ultimately the recipient of consequential adverse effects.
More directly, recipients of these adverse conditions are
fishermen of other resources whose species depend, at some
part of their life cycle, upon the existence of sea urchins,
either as a food source or in a more complex symbiotic
relationship, such as providing a habitat, for those species.
In the strict market-oriented scheme, the determination of
proper resource use through market forces does not account for
these negative externalities. For this reason, other
valuation criteria are necessary in order to place the entire
benefit that a resource has within the ecosystem within the
sphere of market forces.
At this point, the economic tools for measuring these
characteristics of a closed economy are largely lacking in any
practical form, and where they do exist, the measures are
likely to be seen by empirical scientists as far too
subjective for analytical purposes. Nonetheless, the
applicability of these concepts should be pursued so that when
popular recognition of the existence of the closed economic
nature of our global ecosystem does occur, these tools will be
available for use by tomorrow's managers.
Valuation Tools Necessary for the Closed Economy
Of increasing significance to many people is the value of
living organisms and habitats by their very existence; they
have value in and of themselves, whether or not there are
human beings who appreciate them."0 This intrinsic value is
evidenced by the proliferation of many organizations dedicated
to preserving species and habitats simply for the purpose of
protecting the unique characteristics they possess. They may
view the value in such species and habitats either
aesthetically, which appeals to many members of the
population, or more scientifically as a repositories of
accumulated information stored in the genetic make-up of the
various species within the habitat. A benefit which results
from this preservation of the resource in an undisturbed state
is the fulfillment of the specie's natural function in the
ecosystem mentioned earlier; the organisms may provide an
important source of food for other commercially valuable
species or may stabilize the ecosystem by consuming plants
which would otherwise grow unchecked and eventually disturb
the environment. This class of values lies entirely outside
of the realm of current economic evaluative tools; it might be
said that the two classes of valuation, economic and
intrinsic, are incommensurable. As such, they cannot easily
be brought to the table of discussion and considered on equal
terms without some approximating method which can translate
the intrinsic value to units of economic valuation.
The willingness to pay criterion is one method of such a
translation, where people express what amount they would be
willing to pay in order to preserve a resource. The National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration has studied the use of
survey-based techniques to determine the value to society of a
pristine environment by polling how much people would be
50
Pearce, p. 14.
willing to pay to preserve an environment.51 This contingent-
value technique would be a step towards determining the best
use, or non-use, of a resource that holds multiple use
potential. An unfortunate aspect of such an approach is that
it is presented as a hypothetical situation to the people
being polled, and thus may have significant elasticity if the
bill for such preservative measures were to ever come due. In
addition, the theory of pricing may not be appropriate for
naturally occurring, long-term features of the environment
that are not traded in everyday life in a market situation;
the lack of understanding of how these environments contribute
to their lives would also interfere with their ability to form
an accurate currency figure for the value of such resources.52
Another measure which may be of use in ascertaining the
total value that a resource holds is that of option value.
This concept identifies the value that individuals place on
the resource in order to guarantee that it will be available
for use in the future.53 In a sense, it is akin to an
insurance premium that ensures the availability of a resource
whose future viability would otherwise be uncertain. Again,
it is necessary to translate the terms of this valuative
technique into units which are commensurable with those of
current economic theory, thus the tools of the willingness to
pay principle would be employed in order to provide a basis of
comparison for value realized through the consumption of the
resource.
51 Passell, Peter, "Disputed New Role for Polls: Putting a Price Tag
on Nature," The New York Times, 6 September 1993, p. 1.
52 Bartholomew, p. 10.
Pearce, p. 20.
Unlike the existence value above, which is strictly
intrinsic, option value does ultimately realize the market
value of the resource, only at a later date. At that point in
the future, it may be that the market value of the resource is
much greater than it is currently. The information stored
within the genetic make-up of the organism would be one such
source of value, as in the case mentioned in Chapter II where
chemical compounds from sea urchins are being used in a study
of ways to reduce the harmful effects of ultra-violet rays.
The proliferation of pharmaceutical companies performing
research into other sources of naturally-occurring compounds
which are of medical use is evidence of the great value which
can be realized as scientific understanding of the myriad of
species in the global ecosystem increases with time.
These tools for estimating the non-market value of a
resource are in their infancy of development and thus are not
easily considered on an equal basis by many of the people
utilizing natural resources today. As the concept of
sustainable development becomes more familiar and accepted
among a healthy majority of the population, their proper use,
and the benefits that will ultimately be delivered with their
use, will ensure both the future economic and biologic value
that the natural resource holds.
Sustainability: The Goal for Reciprocal Cooperation
The acceptance of sustainability as a goal for economic
activity has been slowly growing among many segments of the
population in recent years, as seen by the changing vocabulary
often seen in discussions of resource usage. This evolution
of our vocabulary occurs as a mixture of new and old concepts
from the open and closed economic mindsets held by different
members of the population. It is a gradual process, and
rightfully so, as any attempt to impose new concepts and
restrictions on economic activity in the name of
sustainability could cause such dislocations in people's
ability to earn a living that they would likely become
entrenched in their unwillingness to consider new ideas in
resource utilization.
For instance, there is a tendency for many people to
speak of "sustainable growth" yet this demonstrates the
misunderstanding of our earth as an open system that persists
in our discourse. For something to grow it increases in size
or scale, relative to the environment in which this activity
occurs. As the economy is a subsystem of the ecosystem, it
can grow to incorporate an ever-increasing proportion of the
total ecosystem but must reach a limit at 100 percent, if not
before.54 It would be more agreeable then, to refer to
sustainable development, as this infers an emphasis on the
evolution of the activity, achieving greater potential in
quality, becoming more stable in operation and more complete
54 Daly, H.E. "Sustainable Growth: An Impossibility Theorem." In
Valuing the Earth: Economics. Ecoloay,. Ethics. Eds. H.E. Daly
and K.N. Townsend. (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1993), p. 267.
in equity. While this may be seen as simply quivering over
semantics, the distinction in meaning over the terms has a
significant impact on the future course of action in managing
limited resources. The World Commission on Environment and
Development, in the Brundtland Commission report, has
suggested a definition of sustainable development as that
which "meets the needs of the present generation without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their
own needs."55
The state of Maine has undertaken new efforts to promote
greater economic activity in hopes of promoting job growth in
its key industries. As part of this effort, a strategic task
force was created by the Maine Legislature in 1993 with the
intention of developing a long-term plan for the state's
economy, based on economic opportunity for all citizens. As
part of its charge, the Legislature explicitly asked that
"sustainable development" be considered in all of its
deliberations. The name of this task force, unfortunately, is
the Maine Economic Growth Council, but this may be seen as the
result of the gradual transition from the differing mindsets;
it need not be seen as a undiminished devotion to the
continuous and unyielding growth of the economy. They offer
the following as their vision statement:
Our vision for Maine is a high quality of
life for all citizens. Central to this
vision is a sustainable economy that offers
an opportunity to everyone to have rewarding
employment and for businesses to prosper, now
and in the future. The people of Maine bring
Brundtland, G.H. et. al. Our Common Future: Report of the World
Commission on Environment and Development. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1987.
this vision into reality by working together,
and building on our tradition of hard work,
dedication, and Yankee ingenuity.56
In addition to this statement, several ideas have been
proposed as underlying principles of their discussion of
growth issues. First, and in great concord with the statement
made on sustainable development by the Brundtland Commission,
is that:
We must invest and act now in such a way to
ensure the prosperity of the current gener-
ation without sacrificing the opportunities
for future generations. Above all, this means
paying close attention to how we use the
environment and natural resources.5 7
In addition to this statement, two other observations have
been made by the council which are important to the success of
their efforts:
Economic growth is the result of a complex
interaction among economic, environmental,
and social factors; success cannot be defined
by examining the separate parts, only by
understanding the cumulative interaction of
the parts.
Efforts to achieve sustainable development
must be continually monitored.58
As a step in achieving these goals for the various
fishing industries, there is recognition within the leadership
56 Maine Economic Growth Council. Goals for Growth: First Report of
the Maine Economic Growth Council. (Published in Greater Bangor
Business Monthly, September, 1995), p. 1.
57 Ibid., p. 3.
58 Ibid., p. 4.
of the Maine government that the participants of the industry
must ultimately take responsibility to conserve the resource.
Speaking to a gathering of industry participants at the Maine
Fisherman's Forum, Governor King asked the industry to be
active in developing a "Maine solution" to save the stocks for
the next generation while avoiding federal legislation. His
administration's slogan for reforming the industry is "power
to the peapods" in seeking solutions from working fishermen.59
As these efforts at including all participants in the
reform process, from working fishermen to processors and
scientists to legislators, are initiated, the sense of working
toward a common purpose of ensuring a sustainable fishery
resource must be at the forefront of all discussions. With
this common goal, it would still be expected that differences
between segments of interested parties will arise as to what
are the fairest and most efficient means of achieving this
goal. For a particular course of action to be accepted as
being ethical by the participants, it is necessary that each
person goes beyond the "I" or the "you" in their deliberations
to the universizable judgement, to the lofty standpoint of the
impartial spectator.60
This would be in accord with John Rawls' suggestion that
each person work toward just rules for all from an original
position behind a "veil of ignorance" which hypothetically
prevents them from knowing their eventual position in society
Meara, E. "King Challenges State Fishermen to Save Industry,"
Bangor Daily News, 6 March 1995, p. IB.
60 Singer, P. Practical Ethics. (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1979), p. 11.
and thus how the rule would eventually affect them.61 These
ideals would go a long ways toward heeding Hardin's advice of
mutual coercion mutually agreed upon by a majority of the
people. Living in a fallible world as we are, however, this
may not be a practically attainable standpoint for many
people, so it would be instructive to look at the experience
of managing common property resources in other fisheries in
Maine as well as in other areas of the world to learn from
their experiences.
61 Tientenberg, T. Environment and Natural Resource Economics.
York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1992), p. 67.
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Chapter VI
Successful Management of Another
Bottom-Dweller: Lobsters
Regulatory History and Organization of the Industry
Lobsters have been harvested from the waters of New
England since the early days of American colonialism, and
could be bought in the markets of Boston in the mid-eighteenth
century. The industry did not begin in earnest, however,
until ships were equipped with holding tanks so that the catch
could be kept alive until they reach their markets on shore
and further inland. The ships became common along the coast
of Maine in the mid-nineteenth century. Canneries helped the
industry to grow further toward the end of the nineteenth
century, allowing the meat to be shipped to more distant
locations inland.6 2 The decline of the lobster population in
the Cap Cod region after 1810 eventually led to a crash the
1880's, so fishing pressure shifted to Maine waters whose
lobster populations eventually began to suffer because of the
indiscriminate processing of all lobster sizes, large and
small, by the canneries.63
62 Martin, K.R. and Lipfert, N.R. Lobstering and the Maine Coast.
(Bath, ME: Maine Maritime Museum, 1985), p. 13.
Ackerman, E.A. New England's Fishing Industry. (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1941), p. 41.
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In response to this decline in lobster catches, the
Legislature enacted a regulation in 1872 which forbade
catching, buying or selling egg-bearing females in an attempt
to ensure they would be able to successfully reproduce. This
was repealed two years later, however, and a size limit of 10.
inches, from head to tail, was imposed as well as a statewide
closure of the fishery from August 1 to October 15.64 The
effect of this seasonal closure was to make the canneries
unprofitable, and the last lobsters were canned in Maine in
1895. Following these measures, the lobster catch has been
remarkably steady, from levels of approximately 25 million
pounds landed in 1898 to about 22.8 million pounds in 1965,
with a dip to about 5 million pounds during the Depression,
attributed largely to over exploitation by fishermen desperate
to make a living in spite of the meager prices being offered
for the catch. In fact, in the last few years there have been
growing record harvests of lobsters, causing some within the
industry to have reservations about the future stability of
the resource.
The regulations that have allowed this consistent growth
in the industry have included: minimum and maximum sizes
allowed for harvesting; prohibition of harvesting egg-bearing
females; closed seasons (both local and statewide); licenses
restricting access to the industry; and gear restrictions.
The size limits (of the lobster's carapace or main body
segment) have fluctuated around a minimum of 3- inches,
currently at 35/16 inches) to a maximum of 5 inches since 1960
(§6431). The harvesting of egg-bearing females throughout the
64 Kelly, K.H. A Summary of Maine Lobster Laws and Rerulations:
1820-1992. Lobster Informational Leaflet #19: Maine Department of
Marine Resources, Augusta, ME, 1992.
year has been forbidden since 1889 and since 1948, any egg-
bearing female caught has to be marked with a V-notch on the
tail; if the lobster is subsequently caught, it must be
released immediately, whether or not it is bearing eggs at
that time (§6436). This regulation, along with the maximum
size limit, ensures that there are a sufficient proportion of
mature lobsters in the population to reproduce.
There have been no statewide closures of harvesting
activities since 1895; various local regions have been closed
from around July 1st to August 31st in accordance with the
wishes of the lobstermen who tend the respective areas, but
these laws have been repealed and exist now only informally.
The existence and enforcement of the informal laws will be
considered later in this chapter. There do currently exist,
however, limitations on the number of traps attached to a buoy
in certain delineated regions of coastal waters (§6439).
Again, these restrictions are codified in accordance with
local practices. The Commissioner of Marine Resources also
has discretion to close certain regions should there be signs
of the lobster population being depleted, or any other
ecological distress, in that region (§6192).
Licenses have been required for all lobster harvesters
since 1915; before this time only non-residents of the state
were required to obtain a license. The residency requirement
for a license has varied from 10 years in the 1940's to as
little as 6 months since 1979, with provisions being made for
veterans in this period to provide them special access.
Currently three classes of licenses are offered for sale, with
a progressive fee for the three classes, which allow a person
to harvest, possess, ship and sell whole lobsters within the
state: class I allows no unlicensed individuals to assist in
harvesting; class II allows one individual to assist; and
class III allows two individuals to assist (§6421).
Additional licenses are required for the wholesale transport,
retail sale, processing or storage of lobsters or lobster
parts.
All gear belonging to a lobster harvester, if a harvester
chooses to catch lobsters using traps, has been required to be
identified with an owner since 1885. Since 1965, all lobsters
must be harvested using traps, with the dimensions of openings
specified by law, providing escape openings for lobsters that
happen to be undersize. Color patterns that a harvester uses
as the buoy marker are required to be displayed conspicuously
on the boat as well(§6432). Should traps become separated from
the buoys, biodegradable escape panels must be built into the
traps to prevent unnecessary lobster mortality (§6433).65
At this time, the majority of lobsters harvested
domestically are marketed in the shell. Having the meat
removed and canned would reduce the value of the unique
crustacean, as it would then have to compete with other canned
meat products. The New England Fishery Management Council
(NEFMC) estimates that 87 percent of landings within the U.S.
are marketed in the shell, either live or freshly cooked."6
The organization that is in place to deliver the live product
from the wharfs to the dinner plate of the consumer consists
of a series of dealers. Meeting the lobstermen at the wharves
65 Ibid.
Botsford, L.W., et. al. Joint Standing Committee on Marine
Resources Study on Biological and Economic Analysis of Lobster Fishery
Policy in Maine. (L.W. Botsford and Associates, April 1986), p. 18.
are the primary wholesalers who are trying to meet the demand
of secondary wholesalers who operate tank shops. These tank
shops store the lobsters until markets are located which are
offering acceptable prices for the catch. In doing this, the
tank shops even-out seasonal variations in supply, and if
necessary, seek lobsters from Canadian dealers in order to
meet their demand levels. The secondary wholesalers, in turn,
provide the lobsters to retailers, who might be supermarkets,
restaurants, or simply seafood retailers, who then provide it
to the consumers at a considerable mark-up over the prices
paid to the lobstermen at the wharf. This mark-up provides
profit to the wholesaler as well as covers the transportation
costs and the costs incurred in maintaining the stock of
lobsters kept alive in holding tanks until they are sold at
favorable times of the season.67
In an effort to bypass the primary dealers who may be
offering what are perceived to be unfair prices in a
relatively isolated fishing community, some lobstermen have
chosen to form cooperatives as an alternative to the wharf-
side dealers. Particularly in the 1940's, these arrangements
provided alternative prices to what the dealers would
otherwise be offering them for their catch. At that time, the
availability of bait for the traps was used as leverage by the
dealers in forcing undervalued bids on the lobstermen; if they
wanted bait, they had to accept the offered price. Later,
cooperatives were formed to replace retired dealers, or as
means for the lobstermen to exert greater control over their
activities by owning the wharfs and having independent
supplies of gas and bait. The cooperatives can also, if they
67 Ibid., p. 23.
are aggressively managed, bypass secondary wholesalers and
contract for a shipper to transport lobsters directly to the
retail markets inland.68 By doing this, the cooperatives
provide a benchmark price to the rest of the industry so other
lobstermen who are not involved in cooperatives can discern
whether the price they are being offered is fair or not.
There is a cost to joining cooperatives, however, financially
as well as a commitment to attend board meetings and work
through the process, often through heated discussion, of the
business and policies that the cooperative will be pursuing.
They may not, however, offer perks that a dealer might provide
to a lobsterman, such as loans and a steady supply of bait.
In a sense, the cooperatives have benefitted the lobstermen
who work through dealers by forcing those dealers to improve
the assortment of services offered to their clients.69
Territoriality of the Lobstering Communities
From the laws that have been written and formalized by
the Legislature, it would appear that anyone who pays for a
license would be able to enter the lobster harvesting
industry. But this overlooks the long-standing communal
relationships between lobstermen's families that extend back
generations and form the core of how the activities of
harvesting are carried out. To go lobster fishing, a person
obviously needs a boat from which to set and pull traps, and
68 Acheson, J.M. The Lobster Gangs of Maine. (Hanover, NH: University
Press of New England, 1988) p. 129.
69 Ibid., p. 131.
in order to operate and maintain a boat for this activity, one
needs a harbor from which to operate, getting supplies before
heading out on the rounds to tend the traps. Each harbor
consists of a group of lobstermen, called a "lobster gang,"
who operate boats out of that harbor and tend traps in a
region of waters limited by either the traveling capabilities
of their boats or by the existence of another lobster gang in
an adjacent community along the coast. The territory that a
lobster gang claims as its own is the result of political
competition between groups of lobstermen carried out over the
decades, and is now established as informal regions, with no
legal recognition, along the coast which are largely
recognized and accepted by the various lobster gangs operating
out of coastal harbors. The formation and maintenance of
these groups of lobstermen has been studied and documented by
James Acheson of the Department of Anthropology at the
University of Maine. His research provides many of the
insights gained in this discussion of the nature and practices
of these lobster gangs.
The delineation of the territorial boundaries between
adjacent harbor gangs is largely accomplished by the alignment
of significant landmarks on the shore. Thus, during the warm
parts of the year, when lobster fishing is done close to the
shore, the delineations are well established; during the
winter months when fishing is done further offshore, there is
more mixing of territories allowed as the boundaries cannot be
as easily discerned. The concentration of lobsters in shallow
waters during warm months further reinforces this sharp
delineation of boundaries, while in the part of the season
where lobsters move offshore, their dispersed habitation
relaxes the need to defend territory from members of
neighboring harbors.
A distinction may be made of the nature of territories
claimed by lobster gangs operating out of a particular harbor.
This distinction generally refers to the amount of mixing
allowed in a territory by the gangs of adjacent harbors. When
there is a strong sense of ownership over a region near the
harbor out of which the lobster gang operates, it may be
classified as a "Nucleated territory." This sense of
ownership grows progressively weaker as the distance from the
harbor increases, until there is a good deal of mixed fishing
which takes place near where the distance between two harbors
is equal. While this allows lobstermen from either of the two
harbors to set traps in this area, it does not necessarily
allow anybody to come in and set traps; there is still a sense
of ownership over the region, although now in a shared sense.70
In other locations along the coast, particularly in
island communities, the boundaries of the regions of ownership
are sharply drawn and defended with no regard to how far a
location might be from the harbor. These regions may be
referred to as "perimeter-defended," as there is very little
mixed fishing in these areas. Even when fishing far from the
shore, lobstermen will not lay traps in a region that is not
recognized to be an exclusive territory of his harbor gang.
In both types of territories, but particularly in perimeter-
defended regions, claims over fishing rights in coastal waters
may be tied to the ownership of land adjacent to those waters.
In island communities, the right to fish in adjacent waters is
Acheson, J.M. "The Lobster Fiefs: Economic and Ecological Effects
of Territoriality on the Maine Lobster Industry," Human Ecology 3
(1975): 187.
often tied to ownership of land on the island; if a whole
island is singularly owned, the rights to fish the adjacent
waters may be rented out to lobstermen from nearby mainland
harbors if they are not being wholly used by the owner.71
This pattern of territoriality exhibited by lobster gangs
has evolved since the early days of lobster fishing when the
technology available, particularly wooden boats, prevented
lobstermen from fishing in the winter, and when fishing was
allowed, the range of their activities was quite limited.
This resulted in maintenance of territory that would be akin
to perimeter-defended, as the little region that a group of
fishermen could harvest from was vigorously defended. This
defense of territory was strongly tied to the lobsterman's
ownership of adjacent land, which often has been inherited for
generations. This pattern of territorial defense has been
maintained in island communities, as mentioned earlier, but in
regions of the coast where populations of lobstermen have
become more dense, particularly regions south of the Modomak
river estuary, the greater range allowed by improving
technology has broken down the perimeter-defended pattern to
yield the nucleated form of territorial defense. As the
greater costs of obtaining new technologies became more
prominent in the fisherman's budget, fishing strategies had to
be adjusted to include a greater area and longer season in
order to bring in larger catches.7
Ibid., p. 191.
72 Ibid., p. 193.
Cooperation between Members of a Lobster Gang
Gaining membership to a lobster gang is dependent first
and foremost on a person being a member of the community.
Under normal circumstances, this is not accomplished by simply
buying land in the community to establish residency, however;
it is usually accomplished by inheritance of an elder's
(usually a father's or uncle's) place in the gang through some
sort of apprenticeship on the boat. If a person began fishing
as an adult, or if he plans to fish only part-time, then his
acceptance by the gang will most likely be quite difficult.
In any case, in nucleated harbors these requirements
supplement a greater emphasis on a demonstrated willingness to
abide by the local fishing norms. In perimeter-defended
harbors, the requirement is stronger in that a person's family
must have a history of owning land on the island or on the
adjacent mainland, or if this is not the case, that they pay a
rental fee for the right to fish in the gang's waters.73
Any behavior by a member of a gang that is considered
deviant of the local fishing norms, such as altering a
competitor's traps, exceeding a trap limit within an area, or
infringing on another member's traditional fishing area, will
eventually by punished anonymously by having their own traps
cut or other damage done to their boat or equipment. While
this retribution is illegal and can result in a loss of
person's license, there is a code of silence among the members
of the community, and even by the victim himself, as there is
a strong tradition within the lobstering industry to minimize
the influence of state officials on their affairs.
Ibid., p. 191.
The benefits of the communal nature of lobster gangs is
evident when emergency situations arise, such as if a boat has
engine trouble or other distress while at sea. Since members
of a gang communicate on a certain CB channel they are
constantly able to get in touch with each other to request
help. In addition, within a gang members develop reciprocal
relationships where assistance is offered in maintaining
equipment or pulling traps during an illness. These ties are
often strengthened through repeated contact in social
situations where gossip, jokes or trade information are
swapped.
Within a gang, a hierarchy develops where the most
successful lobsterman gains the respect of others by his
affluence through efficient fishing effort. The efficiency of
his fishing efforts is of paramount importance in gaining
respect; otherwise, the lobsterman is seen as exerting unfair
pressure on the lobster population within the territory. In
such a case, his success would be attributed to his advantage
in number of traps rather than his skill as a lobsterman. His
willingness to offer assistance or other useful information to
less successful members in respectful ways soothes any
jealousy that may develop because of his success and creates
reciprocal relationships with various members of the gang. As
his time in the gang increases through the years, his
seniority will enable him to have greater freedom in where he
sets his traps, as well as provide him with greater influence
in matters of communal deliberation, such as the first day of
the season to set traps within the territory.74
The sharing of information is often the greatest
4 Acheson, J.M. The Lobster Gangs of Maine, p. 56.
assistance that one fisherman can offer to another, and this
occurs largely along lines of similar hierarchy within a
lobster gang. The most successful members will share
information with each other, while those least successful will
have difficulty in obtaining any useful information at all.
This pattern holds except in relationships with a member's
family; while two brothers in competition might not be open in
sharing information, a younger member of the extended family
would likely receive many valuable tips from an elder in order
to maintain the success and social standing of the family
within the community over the long run. In fact, in
perimeter-defended territories, where the members of a gang
are either family or long-time friends, information about the
location of lobsters may be shared over the radio, in a free
manner so that all members of the community may benefit. In
contrast, where the membership of the gangs are less
stringently controlled and thus where there are a greater
number of members who may be unworthy of receiving valuable
information, inaccurate reports may be circulated so as to
increase competitive advantage over other members."7
The flow of information between lobster gangs is
ordinarily quite limited, as they have little to gain from
sharing information where there are no guarantees of lasting
relationships and communication within gangs occurs on
different frequencies on the CB. Leaders of a gang may share
information with prominent members of other gangs, such as
price information or experimental fishing techniques, in an
effort to gain greater standing within the statewide
75 Palmer, C.T. "When to Bear False Witness: An Evolutionary Approach
to the Social Context of Honesty and Deceit Among Commercial Fishers."
Zvaon. 28 (December 1993), p. 463.
industry." In 1989 when the price of lobsters fell statewide,
the communication between gangs enabled unified actions to be
taken by the normally independent fishermen in order to
protest the perceived collusion on the part of the dealers.
In this case, large numbers of lobstermen over a significant
portion of the coast tied-up their boats in spite of the many
obstacles to their collective action, most prominently the
lack of any previously existing formal communication network
between harbors. Although the actions did not result in a
clear victory in being offered higher prices for their catch,
a significant gain by the industry was the improved network of
communication between harbors along the coast. The concerted
action by the lobstermen demonstrated an ability, at the very
least, to put aside their competitive relationships on the
water to pursue a larger goal of a more stable relationship
with the dealers."
Economic and Ecological Benefits of Lobster Gangs
The lobster gangs allow the members of a fishing
community to become familiar with, and to develop reciprocal
relationships with, other members of their trade who would
otherwise be seen largely as anonymous competitors for a
limited stock of lobsters. Because of the communality
developed over time between members, there is accountability
Acheson, The Lobster Gangs of Maine, p. 58.
77 Palmer, C.T. "Organizing the Coast: Information and Misinformation
during the Maine Lobstermen's Tie-up of 1989," Human Organization 50
(1991), p. 199.
for a person's actions, both good and bad, that will be paid
back at some time in the future. This accountability is one
of the primary reasons for lobstermen's general dislike for
part-time practitioners of the trade; they are relatively
invulnerable to the effects of violating the local norms (trap
cutting and other under-handed sanctions) because of their
smaller capital investments and alternative means of
employment.78
Between the nucleated and perimeter-defended harbors
along the coast, however, there is a further difference in the
practice of harvesting lobsters. Because perimeter-defended
territories are more difficult to gain entry into and because
there is more mixed fishing in nucleated regions, there is a
greater area for each fisherman to set his traps in, on the
average.79 If the fact that the fishermen in perimeter-
defended territories use the same level of capital equipment
as those in nucleated regions is taken into account, there is
less fishing pressure exerted per unit of area in the
perimeter-defended territories. This allows a greater
proportion of lobsters in the territory to reach the minimum
allowable catch size and thus sexual maturity, thereby adding
further to the health of the population.
Because of the stable memberships comprising the
perimeter-defended territories, it is easier for the members
to enact conservation measures, such as trap limits and closed
seasons, within the region. The trap limits allow the
individual lobstermen to limit the investments that they have
7S Acheson, The Lobster Gangs of Maine, p. 67.
Acheson, "The Lobster Fiefs:...," p. 195.
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to make in maintaining and replacing their traps, as well as
the money spent for bait and fuel. Because they spend less
time on the water hauling their traps, depreciation of their
boat equipment is minimized as well. In addition, because
they have fewer traps, they do not place traps in areas that
are not productive and thus improve their yield per trap."0
As an ecological benefit, a fewer number of traps allows
the lobsterman to tend them more often and thus release those
lobsters that are of illegal size and in doing so, allow
mature females to release eggs and reduce mortality of others.
As a result of this greater proportion of lobsters enjoying
reproductive success and growing to legal size in perimeter-
defended territories, a greater percentage of the catch is of
larger lobsters than those caught in nucleated areas; this
results in a greater profit per trap-pull, on the average.
Because lobstermen in perimeter-defended territories are able
to control seasonal access to their waters, they can further
increase the profitability of their catch by timing it to
coincide with the peak prices offered by dealers for their
catch. When all of these factors are taken together, the
average gross income for lobstermen in a perimeter-defended
area was more than 20 percent greater than that of lobstermen
in nucleated territories at the time of Acheson's study.81
The regulatory structure of the lobster industry, along
with the organization of relationships between participants in
the industry, has allowed the volume of landings to remain
remarkably level at between 15 and 22 million pounds without
any major disruptions since the Depression. Both the amount
g Ibid., p. 198.
1 Ibid., p. 203.
of lobsters caught and their value have reached new records in
the first years of this decade, as shown in Figure 11 below.82
Annual Lobster Catch in Maine, 1984 - 1994
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David Dow, executive director of the Maine Lobster Institute
attributes the success to the people in the industry who "have
a really strong conservation ethic." Stating further, "All
these common-sense regulations that our industry agrees with
and abides by is probably at least partially responsible for
why we're having the success we are today."83
82 "Record Year for Lobster," Portland Press Herald, 2 March 1995,
p. 9A.
83 Ibid.
'
Translating Local Norms into Law
These informal rules that are applied by the members of a
lobster gang cannot simply be transferred to a statewide
enforcement level, because the essential accountability
mechanisms could not be maintained at such a large scale
without exorbitant enforcement costs incurred by the
authorities. In order for the implementation of successful
management tools to be accomplished, they must be formulated
and enforced at a local level, where the participants of the
industry have a personal, recognizable stake in their
success.84 By doing this, the state authorities demonstrate
both their respect for the many years of knowledge that the
fishermen have inherited and applied in the experience of
their trade and their desire to integrate this understanding
with the knowledge that biologists have gained from their
research efforts.
The inclusion of the industry participants has been
recognized by the New England Fisheries Management Council as
a necessity, in the case of implementing a management plan for
the industry in 1993 in order to avoid a federally imposed
gauge increase. This loss of freedom to the federal level of
government was accomplished by the cooperation of two
traditionally opposed forces: the regional Council and the
industry participants. By providing funds for the industry to
prepare a first draft of the plan for review by the Council,
the industry has a sense of ownership of the plan from the
84 Palmer, C.T. "Folk Management, 'Soft Evolutionism,' and Fishers'
Motives: Implications for the Regulation of the Lobster Fisheries of
Maine and Newfoundland," Human Organization 52 (1993), p. 418.
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start, thereby increasing the likelihood of success in later
stages of the review process.85
This strategy of including industry participants in the
legislative process as members of a special advisory council
has been adopted by the Maine Department of Marine Resources.
In 1981 the Legislature authorized the formation of the
Lobster Advisory Council with the intention of "fostering and
promoting better methods of conserving, utilizing, processing,
marketing and studying the lobster."8" Each person serving on
the 11 member council is appointed by the Governor, with one
representative from each of the eight coastal counties, two
primary wholesalers, and one member of the general public
holding no license within the lobster industry.
Specifically, the council is authorized to advise the
commissioner of the department on activities that relate to
the lobster industry, including: investigating problems within
the industry and reporting findings to the commissioner and
Marine Resources Advisory Council; reviewing current research
programs and plans for research on the lobster stock and
submitting recommendations on these programs and plans; and
the allocation of money from the Lobster Fund, a fund created
to ensure the successful reproduction of the fishery through
hatchery programs among others. While these functions are
strictly advisory, the opportunity for the industry to
participate constructively in the resolution of current
problems and the planning of future research could serve as a
spring-board to greater responsibilities for the council in
5 Griffin, N. "Lobstermen Work on Their Lobster Plan," National
Fisherman, April 1993, p. 10.
86 §6461, Maine State Law.
101
managing the resource. The most important accomplishment in
this program is the active participation of industry members
in the affairs of the Department of Marine Resources; this
engagement provides a uninhibited path to the Department for
the members of the industry to share their understanding of
the lobster and its environment with their partners in the
regulatory process.
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Chapter VII
Conclusions and Recommendations
for the Sea Urchin Industry in Maine
Conclusions of the Thesis
From the work presented above, a few conclusions may be
drawn about the green sea urchin industry in Maine and the
regulatory response by the managing authority to its early
growth.
First, it may be concluded that, after a couple of years
of largely unregulated harvesting activity following 1987, the
state has enacted several measures which are first steps in
controlling harvesting activities within the state's coastal
waters. The most basic of these is the licensing of all
people who are directly involved with the harvesting, dealing,
transporting or processing of sea urchins in the state. The
licensing provision serves as a basic measure to limit entry
into the industry, thus allowing a limited amount of
accountability within the population of license holders,
limited only by the level of enforcement possible. The
formation of two zones within the coastal waters is an
extension of this accountability purpose, disallowing the
migration of harvesters to regions that have been not been
heavily harvested after they have removed the entire
harvestable urchin stock from the waters near their own
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communities. Finally, the establishment of a minimum
harvestable size prevents the removal of the urchins that have
not had a chance to breed at least once. While consideration
has been given to a roe content by weight measure (10%
minimum), concerns about the unenforceability of this have
deterred its use; instead, a larger minimum size, phased to
24" in two years, has been gaining favor within the industry
as an enforceable provision that will enable urchins to breed
at least twice in their lives.87
Another conclusion that can be made is that the state is
on the right path in the formation of the Sea Urchin Research
Fund through money raised from the licensing of members in the
industry. This provides money for the enforcement of marine
laws and the creation of other programs which will study the
urchin population and its functional biology within the
ecosystem. It is essential that managers understand to as
great an extent as possible, the interconnections with other
valued species in the ecosystem, such as lobsters and
groundfish; these commercially valuable species may depend on
the urchins as a source of food at some point in their life-
cycles. It is possible that a decrease in the urchin
population could deter the restoration of the groundfish stock
because of the diminished presence of food. The log book
provision, while utilized successfully in many other fisheries
in other states, exists only on paper in the urchin industry
in Maine due to a threatened lawsuit by one member that such a
measure is an undue burden on the business operation of the
harvesters, dealers and processors." Another research
87 Higgins, John. Urchin Diver. Personal Communication. 27 March,
1996.
88 Creaser, Ted. MDMR. Personal Communication. 25 March, 1996.
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provision that has yet to be implemented is the creation of
reserved areas along the coast in order to determine a
baseline for population studies which will discern human
effects from harvesting from natural fluctuations of the
population.
Third, the current investment in research will allow
managers in the future to define ecologically sound limits to
harvesting activities. The minimum size is only a starting
point in this respect; the requirement that all urchin catches
must be culled at sea ensures that those individuals that are
too small to be harvested will be returned to their feeding
ground where they may continue to grow and successfully
reproduce with other urchins. Further research will also
allow the timing of harvesting activities to coincide with the
season of maximum value held by the urchins, when their roe
content is at a maximum and its quality is at a level where
the Japanese consumer will continue to recognize Maine urchins
as a product of premium quality. This would be an efficient
outcome for all members of the industry; the greatest return
for a measured amount of effort. By continuing to harvest and
process urchins that are of substandard quality, members of
the industry in Maine are diminishing their future earning
potential by damaging the reputation for quality for which
Maine urchins have previously been known. Finally, research
efforts may provide conclusive evidence that heavy drags
currently being used to land urchins causes damage to both the
harvested urchins and to the benthic environment in which they
live and grow. This may enable the replacement of this type
of equipment with other methods for harvesting, such as a
light drag (ex., the "green drag") or bait and catch methods.
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Fourth, it may be concluded that implementing the
guidelines resulting from these research efforts will require
coordination with and cooperation among members of the
industry. In order for this to be possible, it is necessary
that these findings be mutually acceptable to a majority of
the members; therefore, when at all possible, research efforts
should be carried out by independent scientists whose findings
cannot be challenged because of allegations of a conflict of
interest in the outcome. This may be more feasible if a
change in attitude toward the stock of natural resources is
reached where it is not the rate of removal that is to be
maximized, but the value attained from the removal of that
resource that is to be maximized. By doing this, option value
is preserved for the resource, as well as any corresponding
benefit that the ecosystem derives from the unharvested
resource. This change of view necessarily involves a
extension of the horizon being considered economically, and
thus a lowering of the discount rate to a level where future
costs and benefits carry a much more significant value in
relation to immediate costs and benefits considered by many
members of the industry today. In the case that many
participants in the industry hold this viewpoint today,
expressed in their desire for a sustainable industry, this
must be openly acknowledged and translated, to as great an
extent as possible, "mutual restrictions, mutually recognized
by a majority of the population."
This leads to the final conclusion, that it is not
feasible for the state to carry out all, or even most, of the
enforcement functions required for the maintenance of a
sustainable industry. At this time of fiscal austerity for
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all of the state agencies, enforcement of laws and regulations
not directly affecting the public welfare is of secondary
importance. Therefore, these acknowledged limits on what is
considered to be acceptable harvesting activities must be
enforced within the community of harvesters through peaceful
means of coercion. When members interact often and over an
extended period of time, they recognize each other and are
able to recall past behaviors, whether deviant or cooperative
to the mutually recognized goal of a sustainable industry.
The greater the number of members who are willing to stand up
to deviant behavior, the greater the social force will be on
that person by withholding useful information or denying
assistance in a time of need. Of course, there is no hard-
and-fast rule that can be applied for deviant behavior; each
situation must be assessed and acted upon individually. The
concerted action of the members will be facilitated by stable,
limited, localized populations of harvesters who are
accountable to the communities in which they live.
Recommendations to the Industry
In light of the conclusions provided above, the following
recommendations are made to the industry as measures which
will assist in the formation and maintenance of a sustainable
sea urchin industry.
0 The requirement that log books be kept by wholesale
dealers and processors should be implemented as a
necessary measure to obtain information about the effort
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being expended by harvesters for the amount of urchins
being landed from a particular region of the coast.
Limited areas should be designated along the coast in
order for observations to be made about the natural
fluctuation of urchin populations which occur
periodically and independently of the activities of
urchin harvesters.
* Heavy dragging equipment should be phased out for use
in the industry because of the resulting damage to
urchins and their benthic environment. Subsidies in the
form of a buy-back program might be useful in encouraging
alternative harvesting technologies, such as baiting and
trapping or airlift systems, to be explored.
* A council comprised of a geographic and functional
cross-section of the industry from each zone should be
formed and endowed with a special consultative
designation to the Joint Standing Committee on Marine
Resources in order to empower the members of the industry
and thus gain greater compliance with the rules that are
adopted.
* A Sea Urchin Promotion Panel should be created in order
to explore other markets for the export of processed sea
urchins so that the industry's dependence on the Japanese
market will be marginalized should trade conditions
between the two countries deteriorate.
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The concept of utilizing zones to limit the migration
aggressive harvesters along the coast should be developed
further to incorporate the benefits of territoriality
that the lobstering communities enjoy. Zones might be
formed in smaller units along the coast to promote
familiarity among harvesters and encourage mutually
cooperative relationships.
Summary of the Thesis
This thesis was an examination of the sea urchin industry
in Maine as a example of the utilization of a finite,
renewable, common property resource by agents of the public
domain. The growth of the sea urchin export industry, first
on the West Coast of America, followed by the expansion in
Maine, was documented, as well as the resulting formation of
the regulatory structure in order to manage the recently
commercially-valued resource.
Because the resource is located only in the marine
environment, only those persons with access to the sea can
harvest the resource, yet when the density of harvesters
reaches a certain level, self-imposed restrictions on
activities must be enacted in order to prevent the catastro-
phic failure of the sea urchin population. The logical
failure of competitive agents to conserve a common resource
was presented through a consideration of Garrett Hardin's
"'Tragedy of the Commons."
The use of game theory in modeling competitive situations
between agents in a closed population was explored in order to
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gain any understanding of the conditions which foster
cooperation between members of the population. Such
cooperation may evolve if there is sufficient recognition and
familiarity between members of the population and the rewards
and punishments for cooperative and deviant behavior,
respectively, are significant enough to coerce compliance with
the mutually accepted rules.
The recognition that the resources in the environment are
ultimately finite was advanced and sustainability as a goal
for economic activity was proposed in light of underutilized
evaluative tools for natural resources, such as option,
indirect-use, and existence value. The use of the discount
rate in financial analyses was presented along with the flaws
of using an inflated rate along with misappropriated values of
natural resources. The necessity of including the members of
the industry in forming a sustainable development plan was
emphasized in the conclusion of this section.
The lobster industry was then considered as an example of
a community of competitive agents who cooperate amongst
themselves in order to manage the quality of the resource and
limit effort expended in harvesting that resource. The
structure and maintenance of their territorial units was
examined in order to understand what traits may be applied to
the urchin industry.
Finally, conclusions of the thesis and recommendations to
the industry were presented, along with a brief summary
describing the structure of the thesis.
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